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Despite	  a	  raft	  of	  policies	  targeting	  biodiversity,	  Australia	  has	  yet	  to	  stem	  biodiversity	  decline.	  
This	   study	   analyses	   biodiversity	   conservation	   policies	   in	   two	   contrasting	   Australian	  
landscapes,	  with	  a	  specific	  emphasis	  on	  how	  authority	  and	  responsibility	  are	  determined	  and	  
allocated	  using	  a	  novel	   linguistic	   tool	   (the	   Institutional	  Grammar	  Tool)	  and	   interviews	  with	  
policy	   makers.	   Analysis	   revealed	   concerns	   around	   the	   narrowness	   of	   authority	   and	   the	  
dominance	   of	   normative	   statements	   rather	   than	   rules.	   Unclear	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	  
further	   diluted	   the	   clarity	   and	   allocation	   of	   authority.	   Political	   and	   economic	   factors	   drive	  
policy	  implementation	  and	  constrain	  authority	  in	  both	  regions.	  A	  heavy	  focus	  on	  procedures	  
rather	   than	   outcomes	   was	   also	   evident.	   Implications	   for	   policy	   design	   and	   the	   associated	  
authority	   include	   broadening	   the	   definition	   of	   biodiversity,	   ensuring	   policy	   language	  more	  
clearly	   allocates	   responsibilities,	   paying	   increased	   attention	   to	   the	   distributive	   as	   well	   as	  
procedural	   elements	   of	   biodiversity	   policy,	   and	   developing	   buffering	  mechanisms	   to	   better	  
cope	  with	  political	  and	  economic	  drivers.	  
	  
1	  	  Introduction	  
Biodiversity	  loss	  is	  a	  critical	  concern	  on	  the	  global	  environmental	  agenda;	  and	  the	  rate	  
of	   loss	  has	  already	  exceeded	  critical	   thresholds,	  posing	  significant	   risks	   to	   the	   resilience	  of	  
ecosystems.1	  Australia	   exemplifies	   the	   seriousness	   of	   this	   crisis.	   The	   country	   is	   a	   global	  
biodiversity	  hotspot	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  endemism	  and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  mega-­‐diverse	  in	  
the	   world,2	  as	   well	   as	   one	   of	   the	   world’s	   most	   economically	   wealthy.3	  Conservation	   of	  
biodiversity	   has	   been	   enshrined	   in	   Australia’s	   legislation	   and	   in	   a	   suite	   of	   policies	   and	  
programs	  for	  decades.	  Yet	  this	  unique	  natural	  heritage	  –	  and	  apparent	  capacity	  to	  protect	  it	  
–	   is	   juxtaposed	  against	  very	  high	  extinction	  rates,	   including	  the	  highest	  mammal	  extinction	  
rate	  in	  the	  world.4	  	  
The	  failure	  to	  stem	  ecosystem	  decline	  has	  been	  blamed	  on	  numerous	  factors,	  many	  in	  
the	   realm	   of	   governance.	   Inadequate	   responses	   to	   threatening	   processes	   such	   as	   fire,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Rockström,	  J	  et	  al,	  "A	  safe	  operating	  space	  for	  humanity"	  (2009)	  461(7263)	  Nature	  472	  
2	  Lindenmayer,	  D	  and	  Burgman,	  M,	  Practical	  conservation	  biology	  (CSIRO	  publishing,	  Melbourne,	  2005)	  p	  43	  
3	  Enright,	  MJ	  and	  Petty,	  R,	  Australia's	  Competitiveness:	  From	  Lucky	  Country	  to	  Competitive	  Country	  (Wiley,	  Singapore,	  
2013)	  p	  2	  
4	  Woinarski,	  JCZ,	  Burbidge,	  A	  and	  Harrison,	  P,	  The	  Action	  Plan	  for	  Australian	  Mammals	  2012	  (CSIRO	  Publishing,	  Collingwood,	  
VIC,	  2014)	  p	  2	  
	  	  
climate	  change,	  and	  invasive	  species	  have	  been	  blamed	  in	  part	  for	  the	  poor	  performance.5	  A	  
recent	   review	  of	   the	  Environment	  Protection	  and	  Biodiversity	  Conservation	  Act	  1999	   (Cth),	  
Australia’s	  central	  legal	  framework	  for	  conserving	  biodiversity,	  criticised	  the	  Act’s	  emphasis	  
on	   protection	   of	   rare,	   threatened	   species	  without	   a	   commensurate	   focus	   on	   the	   broader	  
ecological	  context.6	  To	  improve	  Australia’s	  track	  record,	  the	  review	  called	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  
more	  landscape-­‐scale	  approaches.	  Broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  current	  approaches	  is	  needed	  to	  
address	  ecological	  processes7	  and	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  biodiversity	  decline.8	  
While	   such	   a	   shift	   would	   address	   decades	   of	   ecological	   critiques	   of	   single-­‐species	  
approaches,9	  moving	   from	   theory	   to	   practice	   in	   landscape-­‐scale	   biodiversity	   conservation	  
has	   been	   challenging. 10 	  Though	   a	   landscape	   focus	   is	   now	   evident	   in	   many	   initiatives	  
throughout	  the	  country,11	  formal	  authority	   in	  Australia,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   legislative	  mandate,	  
remains	  tightly	  linked	  to	  the	  threatened	  species	  and	  ecological	  communities	  paradigm.	  Even	  
those	   organisations	  with	   formal	   authority	   are	   not	   necessarily	   empowered	   to	   act	   at	   larger	  
scales.	   Authority	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   good	   governance, 12 	  bestowing	   formal	   roles	   and	  
responsibilities	  on	   individuals	  and	  organisations	  and	   influencing	  how	  power	  and	   resources	  
are	  distributed.13	  	  
The	  public	  good	  characteristics	  of	  biodiversity	  also	  call	  for	  consideration	  of	  authority.	  
Identifying	   and	   allocating	   authority	   and	   responsibility	   for	   conserving	   biodiversity	   is	  
challenging,	   especially	   when	   this	   public	   good	   is	   located	   on	   private	   property.	   Although	  
authority	   and	   responsibility	   should	  be	  delegated	   to	   the	  appropriate	   levels,	   retaining	   some	  
central	   authority	   and	   standard	   setting	   by	   governments	   is	   required	   to	   reconcile	   local	   costs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  eg	  McGregor,	  A	  et	  al,	  "What	  are	  the	  policy	  priorities	  for	  sustaining	  ecological	  processes?	  A	  case	  study	  from	  Victoria,	  
Australia"	  (2011)	  12(3)	  Ecological	  Management	  &	  Restoration	  194	  at	  195	  
6	  Hawke,	  A,	  The	  Australian	  Environment	  Act:	  Final	  Report	  of	  Independent	  review	  of	  the	  Environment	  Protection	  and	  
Biodiversity	  Conservation	  Act	  1999	  (Department	  of	  the	  Environment,	  2009)	  p	  10	  
7	  Coffey,	  B	  and	  Wescott,	  G,	  "New	  directions	  in	  biodiversity	  policy	  and	  governance?	  A	  critique	  of	  Victoria's	  Land	  and	  
Biodiversity	  White	  Paper"	  (2010)	  17(4)	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Management	  204	  at	  208	  
8	  Dovers,	  S	  and	  Hussey,	  K,	  Environment	  and	  sustainability:	  a	  policy	  handbook	  (Federation	  Press,	  Annandale,	  2013)	  	  p	  59	  
9	  See	  eg	  Noss,	  RF,	  "From	  plant	  communities	  to	  landscapes	  in	  conservation	  inventories:	  A	  look	  at	  the	  nature	  conservancy	  
(USA)"	  (1987)	  41(1)	  Biological	  Conservation	  11	  at	  12	  	  
10	  Lindenmayer,	  DB	  et	  al,	  "A	  checklist	  for	  ecological	  management	  of	  landscapes	  for	  conservation"	  (2008)	  11(1)	  Ecology	  
Letters	  78	  at	  79	  
11	  See	  eg	  Fitzsimons,	  J,	  Pulsford,	  I	  and	  Wescott,	  G	  (eds),	  Linking	  Australia's	  Landscapes:	  Lessons	  and	  Opportunities	  from	  
Large-­‐scale	  Conservation	  Networks	  ((CSIRO	  Publishing,	  2013).	  
12	  Brechin,	  SR	  et	  al,	  "Beyond	  the	  Square	  Wheel:	  Toward	  a	  More	  Comprehensive	  Understanding	  of	  Biodiversity	  Conservation	  
as	  Social	  and	  Political	  Process"	  (2002)	  15(1)	  Society	  &	  Natural	  Resources	  41	  at	  46	  
13	  Hutchcroft,	  PD,	  "Centralization	  and	  Decentralization	  in	  Administration	  and	  Politics:	  Assessing	  Territorial	  Dimensions	  of	  
Authority	  and	  Power"	  (2001)	  14(1)	  Governance	  23	  at	  26	  
	  	  
and	   public	   benefits. 14 	  Also,	   the	   evidence	   is	   weak	   that	   decentralisation	   is	   effective	   in	  
achieving	   biodiversity	   outcomes. 15 	  The	   multiscalar	   nature	   of	   biodiversity	   conservations	  
means	   delegation	   will	   cross	   jurisdictions,	   governance	   levels,	   and	   require	   the	   cooperation	  
and	  coordination	  of	  disparate	  actors	  across	  governance	  levels.	  	  
Mirroring	  other	  areas	  of	  environmental	  governance,	  biodiversity	  governance	  has	  taken	  
an	   increasingly	   networked	   form,	   where	   resources,	   authority	   and	   responsibility	   are	  widely	  
dispersed	  among	  government	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  actors.	  These	  complex	  actor	  networks	  
must	  collectively	  set	  and	  implement	  the	  rules	  and	  norms	  that	  drive	  governance.16	  Successful	  
cooperation	  and	  policy	  implementation	  among	  multiple	  actors	  requires	  clearly	  defined	  and	  
mutually	  understood	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  as	  well	  as	  clearly	  defined	  objectives.17	  All	  of	  
these	   issues	   are	   closely	   linked	   to	   core	   principles	   of	   good	   governance,	   especially	  
accountability,	   which	   concerns	   the	   allocation	   and	   acceptance	   of	   responsibilities	   and	  
justification	   of	   decisions	   and	   actions.	   Legitimacy	   is	   another	   principle	   of	   good	   governance	  
linked	  to	  authority,	  as	   it	  encompasses	   the	  validity	  of	  an	  actor’s	  authority	   to	  govern,	  which	  
does	  not	  solely	  originate	  in	  law,	  and	  the	  integrity	  with	  which	  it	  is	  exercised.18	  
Actors	   responsible	   for	   implementing	   policy	   need	   appropriate	   levels	   of	   authority	   to	  
respond	   to	   drivers	   and	   take	   action.	   Dynamics	   between	   biodiversity	   institutions,	   economic	  
institutions,	   and	   the	  political	   arena	  are	  of	  particular	   relevance.	  Biodiversity	   institutions	  do	  
not	   operate	   in	   isolation	   from	   the	   broader	   policy	   context;	   they	   interact	   strongly	   and	  
continually	   with	   many	   other	   institutional	   arrangements	   (e.g.	   agricultural	   development,	  
water	   use). 19 	  	   These	   dynamics	   mean	   development	   agendas	   are	   often	   at	   odds	   with	  
achievement	   of	   biodiversity	   conservation	   objectives,	   and	   the	   successful	   pursuit	   of	   both	  
economic	   development	   and	   biodiversity	   conservation	   objectives	   has	   been	   elusive. 20	  
Biodiversity	  governance	  has	  also	  had	  little	  influence	  on	  other	  sectors	  or	  economic	  and	  land	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ring,	  I,	  "Biodiversity	  governance:	  adjusting	  local	  costs	  and	  global	  benefits'"	  in	  T.	  Sikor	  (ed),	  Public	  and	  Private	  in	  Natural	  
Resource	  Governance.	  A	  False	  Dichotomy?	  (Earthscan,	  2008)	  107-­‐126	  at	  pp	  112-­‐113	  
15	  Miteva,	  DA,	  Pattanayak,	  SK	  and	  Ferraro,	  PJ,	  "Evaluation	  of	  biodiversity	  policy	  instruments:	  what	  works	  and	  what	  
doesn’t?"	  (2012)	  28(1)	  Oxford	  Review	  of	  Economic	  Policy	  69	  at	  75	  
16	  Börzel,	  TA,	  "Networks:	  reified	  metaphor	  or	  governance	  panacea?	  "	  (2011)	  89(1)	  Public	  Administration	  49	  p	  154-­‐155	  
17	  See	  eg	  Mattessich,	  PW	  and	  Monsey,	  BR,	  Collaboration:	  what	  makes	  it	  work.	  A	  review	  of	  research	  literature	  on	  factors	  
influencing	  successful	  collaboration	  (Wilder	  Research	  Centre,	  Saint	  Paul,	  1992)	  	  p	  24;	  see	  also	  Hill,	  M	  and	  Hupe,	  P,	  
Implementing	  Public	  Policy:	  Governance	  in	  Theory	  and	  in	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  (SAGE	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  2002)	  	  p	  151	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  M,	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  A	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  and	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  outcomes"	  
(2010)	  91(3)	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Management	  754	  at	  758	  
19	  Paavola,	  J,	  Gouldson,	  A	  and	  Kluvánková-­‐Oravská,	  T,	  "Interplay	  of	  actors,	  scales,	  frameworks	  and	  regimes	  in	  the	  
governance	  of	  biodiversity"	  (2009)	  19(3)	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  Policy	  and	  Governance	  148	  at	  151	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  al,	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  and	  human	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  (2011)	  
144(3)	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use	  policies,	  which	  often	  have	  goals	  that	  contravene	  biodiversity	  conservation	  objectives.21	  
The	  deep	  involvement	  of	  the	  state	  in	  subsidising	  and	  actively	  pursuing	  development,	  often	  
at	   the	   expense	   of	   ecological	   sustainability,	   has	   a	   long	   history	   in	   Australia.22	  All	   of	   this	  
suggests	  authority	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  is	  complicated	  and	  weakened	  by	  confrontations	  
with	   strong	   economic	   and	   political	   drivers,	   a	   question	   explored	   in	   each	   of	   the	   Australian	  
landscapes	  in	  this	  study.	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   study	   was	   to	   analyse	   biodiversity	   conservation	   policies	   in	   two	  
contrasting	  Australian	   landscapes,	  with	  a	   strong	   focus	  on	  how	  authority	  and	   responsibility	  
are	  determined	  and	  allocated.	  As	  biodiversity	  conservation	  activities	  move	  beyond	  a	  species	  
focus	  to	  concentrate	  on	  landscapes,	  the	  complexity	  of	  these	  settings	  requires	  clear	  attention	  
to	   authority	   and	   responsibility.	   Little	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	   date	   to	   comprehensive	  
analyses	  of	  these	  attributes	  with	  respect	  to	  biodiversity.	  This	  paper	  combines	  an	  analysis	  of	  
policies-­‐on-­‐paper,	   accessed	   through	   application	   of	   a	   novel	   linguistic	   tool,	   with	   analysis	   of	  
policies-­‐in-­‐practice,	  accessed	  through	  in-­‐depth	  interviews.	  The	  findings	  provide	  a	  firm	  basis	  
for	   policy	   design	   as	   well	   as	   an	   effective	   mixed	   methodology	   suitable	   for	   further	   policy	  
analysis	  efforts.	  	  
2	  	  Case	  studies	  and	  the	  governance	  context	  
Two	  case	  study	  regions	  with	  significant	  biodiversity	  features,	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  
and	   the	  Australian	  Alps	   (Figures	  1	   and	  2),	   provided	   the	   testing	   ground	   for	   examining	  how	  
authority	  and	   responsibility	  are	  determined	  and	  allocated	   in	  Australian	  biodiversity	  policy.	  	  
Before	   turning	   to	   the	   case	   studies,	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   Australia’s	   system	   of	   government	  
provides	  context	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  responsibility,	  accountability	  and	  authority.	  Australia’s	  
decentralised	  model	   of	   federalism	  means	   state	   governments	   retain	   primary	   constitutional	  
and	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  land	  use	  decisions	  and	  for	  managing	  land,	  water,	  and	  biodiversity.	  
Section	  51	  of	  the	  Constitution	  confers	  only	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  concurrent	  legislative	  powers	  to	  
the	   Australian	   Government. 23 	  Although	   these	   ‘heads	   of	   power’	   do	   not	   include	   the	  
environment,	   the	   federal	   government	   has	   expanded	   its	   power	   through	   case	   law,	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development	   of	   cooperative	   arrangements,	   and	   increased	   financial	   dominance. 24	  
Empowered	  by	   the	   external	   affairs	   power,	   the	   federal	   government	   enacted	   the	   EPBC	  Act,	  
which	  lists	  nationally	  and	  internationally	  threatened	  and	  endangered	  flora,	  fauna,	  ecological	  
communities	   and	   heritage	   places,	   all	   defined	   as	   matters	   of	   national	   environmental	  
significance	  (MNES).	  	  
Though	  constitutional	  change	   is	  difficult	   in	  Australia,	  constitutional	  advancement	  has	  
occurred	  through	  case	  law	  and	  administration.25	  Australia’s	  brand	  of	  federalism	  has	  become	  
increasingly	   centralised.26	  The	  Australian	  Government	  plays	  a	   significant	   role	   in	   setting	   the	  
agenda	   and	   guiding	   policy,	   although	   the	   states	   still	   retain	   much	   of	   the	   authority	   and	  
responsibility	   for	   implementation,	   including	   the	   development	   and	   implementation	   of	  
biodiversity	  policy.	  The	  federal	  government	  has	  remained	  reluctant	  to	  expand	  its	  powers	  too	  
far	  without	  strong	  public	   support,	  however,	  as	  moves	   that	  are	  not	  well	   supported	  tend	  to	  
attract	   criticism	   and	   litigation	   from	   the	   states. 27 	  Successful	   collective	   action	   rests	   on	  
frequent	   negotiations	   across	   jurisdictions	   and	   actors,	   making	   consistency	   and	   progress	  
difficult	   to	   achieve.28	  The	   complexity	   of	   these	   nested	   arrangements	   suggests	   a	   need	   for	  
clarity	   around	  who	   does	  what	   and	  who	   has	   the	   power	   to	   act,	   if	   collective	   action	   is	   to	   be	  
successful.	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Figure	  1	  Location	  of	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  	   	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Location	  of	  the	  Australian	  Alps	  
	  
	  	  
2.1	  	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  
The	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  has	  been	  listed	  as	  one	  of	  Australia’s	  15	  national	  biodiversity	  
hotspots	   for	   its	   high	   level	   of	   endemism	  under	   threat.29	  The	  Midlands	   is	   one	   of	   the	   oldest	  
continually	  grazed	  and	  first	  areas	  in	  Australia	  to	  be	  cleared	  for	  agriculture.30	  The	  landscape	  is	  
a	  mosaic	  of	  farmland	  and	  native	  vegetation,	  primarily	  grasslands	  and	  dry	  eucalypt	  forest.31	  
Native	   vegetation	   is	   less	   than	   30	   per	   cent	   of	   its	   original	   extent,	   fragmented,	   and	   often	   in	  
poor	  condition.32	  Land	   is	  predominantly	  privately	  owned,	   thus	  private	   landholders	  manage	  
most	   of	   this	   remnant	   native	   vegetation.	   Less	   than	   2	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   region	   is	   in	   public	  
reserves,33	  so	   conservation	   in	   this	   landscape	   requires	   the	   collective	   action	   of	   individual	  
landholders.	  Biodiversity	  governance	  has	  taken	  a	  highly	  networked	  form,	  with	  landholders,	  
government,	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations,	   and	   regional	   groups	   all	   playing	   important	  
roles.	  
An	   irrigation	  scheme	  under	  development	   in	   the	   region	  provides	   the	  backdrop	   to	   the	  
documents	   analysed	   in	   this	   article.	   The	   federal	   government	   requested	   that	   a	   strategic	  
assessment	   be	   conducted	   on	   the	  Midlands	  Water	   Scheme	   (MWS)	   to	   assess	   its	   impact	   on	  
Lowland	  Native	  Grasslands	  listed	  under	  the	  EPBC	  Act.	  The	  assessment	  area	  includes	  59	  per	  
cent	  of	  the	  remaining	  federally	  listed	  grasslands	  on	  private	  land,34	  but	  it	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  
biodiversity	  attributes	  not	   listed	  under	  the	  Act.	   In	   this	  degraded	   landscape,	   the	  potentially	  
dramatic	   increase	   in	   land	  under	   irrigation	   could	  be	   a	   significant	  driver	  of	   land	  use	   change	  
and	  biodiversity	  decline.	  
2.2	  	  Australian	  Alps	  
The	   Australian	   Alps	   is	   a	  mountain	   range	   about	   500	   km	   long	   spanning	   the	   states	   of	  
Victoria	  and	  New	  South	  Wales	  (NSW)	  and	  the	  Australian	  Capital	  Territory	  (ACT).	  Reserved	  as	  
a	   series	   of	   national	   parks,	   its	   land	   tenure	   is	   secure;	   but	   its	   nationally	   and	   internationally	  
significant	   biodiversity	   values,	   including	   many	   endemic	   alpine	   and	   subalpine	   species,	   still	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face	   threats	   from	   invasive	   plants	   and	   animals,	   climate	   change,	   and	   dwindling	   public	  
resources	  and	  support	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation.35	  
Under	  the	  Australian	  Constitution	  land	  management	  responsibilities,	  including	  national	  
park	  management,	  rest	  with	  the	  states	  and	  territories.	  Parks	  Victoria,	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  
National	   Parks	   and	   Wildlife	   Service	   (NPWS)	   and	   Australian	   Capital	   Territory	   Parks	   and	  
Conservation	  Service	  are	  the	  state	  and	  territory	  agencies	  with	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  land	  
management	  in	  the	  bioregion.	  Cooperation	  across	  three	  jurisdictions,	  along	  with	  the	  federal	  
government,	   is	   through	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   National	   Parks	   Cooperative	   Management	  
Program,	  which	  has	  operated	  under	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  (MOU)	  since	  1986.36	  
The	   Australian	   Alps	   Liaison	   Committee	   (AALC)	   is	   the	   central	   coordinating	   body	   under	   the	  
Program,	  with	  responsibility	  for	  preparing	  the	  strategic	  plan	  required	  by	  the	  MOU.	  The	  MOU	  
has	   proven	   strong	   and	   flexible	   enough	   to	   survive	   political	   and	   funding	   cycles,	   major	   fire	  
events,	  and	  some	  contentious	  management	  issues	  like	  cattle	  grazing	  in	  the	  Victorian	  Alps.37	  	  
3	  	  Methods	  
This	  research	  adopted	  a	  dual	  methodological	  focus	  of	  analysing	  policies-­‐on-­‐paper	  and	  
policies-­‐in-­‐practice,	   acknowledging	   institutions	   evolve	   over	   time	   and	   often	   deviate	  
substantially	  from	  their	  documented	  origins.38	  A	  mixed	  method	  approach	  based	  on	  linguistic	  
analysis	  of	  policy	  documents	  and	  semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  were	  used	  as	  complementary	  
methods	  to	  access	  policies	  on	  paper	  and	  in	  practice,	  respectively.	  
Linguistic	   analysis	   relied	   on	   the	   Institutional	   Grammar	   Tool	   (IGT)	   to	   analyse	   and	  
understand	   the	   structure	   and	   content	   of	   institutional	   arrangements. 39 	  Analysing	   the	  
linguistic	  content	  of	  policies	  helps	  uncover	  messages	  to	  the	  groups	  targeted	  by	  the	  policies,	  
and	   analysis	   of	   institutional	   design	   may	   reveal	   important	   aspects	   of	   the	   political	   and	  
institutional	   context.40	  The	  method	   aligns	   with	   the	   complex	   characteristics	   of	   biodiversity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Lockwood,	  M	  et	  al,	  'Biodiversity	  governance	  and	  social-­‐ecological	  system	  dynamics:	  transformation	  in	  the	  Australian	  Alps'	  
(2014)	  19(2)	  Ecology	  and	  Society	  13	  <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art13/>.	  
36	  Crabb,	  P,	  Managing	  the	  Australian	  Alps:	  a	  history	  of	  cooperative	  management	  of	  the	  Australian	  Alps	  national	  parks	  
(Australian	  Alps	  Liaison	  Committee	  and	  Australian	  National	  University,	  Canberra,	  2003)	  	  
37	  Crabb,	  P	  and	  Dovers,	  S,	  "Managing	  natural	  resources	  across	  jurisdictions:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Australian	  Alps"	  (2007)	  14(4)	  
Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Environmental	  Management	  210	  at	  214-­‐215	  
38	  Ostrom,	  E,	  Understanding	  institutional	  diversity	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton,	  2005)	  pp	  19-­‐22	  
39	  Crawford,	  S	  and	  Ostrom,	  E,	  "A	  Grammar	  of	  Institutions'",	  Understanding	  institutional	  diversity	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
2005)	  3-­‐31	  	  p	  137	  
40	  Mondou,	  M	  and	  Montpetit,	  É,	  "Policy	  Styles	  and	  Degenerative	  Politics:	  Poverty	  Policy	  Designs	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  
Quebec	  Mondou/Montpetit:	  Policy	  Styles	  and	  Degenerative	  Politics"	  (2010)	  38(4)	  Policy	  Studies	  Journal	  703	  at	  704	  
	  	  
policy. 41 	  By	   providing	   a	   structured	   method	   to	   identity	   and	   categorise	   institutional	  
statements,	   researchers	   can	   aggregate	   the	   minutia	   of	   policy	   to	   reveal	   practically	   and	  
theoretically	  relevant	  relationships.42	  	  
Application	  of	  the	  IGT	  generates	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  what	  actions	  are	  prescribed,	  
permitted	   or	   obliged,	   who	   can	   participate,	   and	   under	   what	   conditions.43	  This	   provides	   a	  
structured	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  intended	  target	  of	  policies	  and	  how	  policies	  prescribe	  
opportunities	  and	  constraints.	  After	  parsing	  and	  coding	  individual	  statements,	  the	  data	  can	  
be	  analysed	   individually,	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  as	  nested	  groups.44	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   the	   tool	   is	  
limited	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  access	  the	  often	  tacit	  and	  habituated	  elements	  of	  institutions,	  as	  they	  
are	  not	  always	  expressed	   in	   linguistic	   statements	   that	  are	  easily	  parsed	  and	  analysed	  with	  
this	  empirical	  tool.	  This	  limitation	  is	  well	  known45;	  however,	  few	  studies	  to	  date	  have	  tested	  
or	   supported	   the	   IGT	  with	   complementary	  methods	   such	   as	   interviews.46	  Further,	   the	   IGT	  
has	  so	  far	  only	  been	  tested	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Pakistan.	  	  
As	  such,	  this	  study	  relied	  on	  in-­‐depth	  interviewing	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  how	  policies	  
are	   understood	   and	   implemented	   in	   practice.	   Crawford	   and	   Ostrom47 	  highlighted	   that	  
institutional	  statements,	  as	   identified	  and	  analysed	  using	  the	   IGT,	  only	  matter	   if	   the	  target	  
and	  users	  of	  the	  policy	  know	  and	  use	  them,	  and	  just	  because	  a	  statement	  can	  be	  analysed	  
with	  the	  tool	  does	  not	   indicate	  the	  statement	   is	  meaningful	   in	  a	  practical	  sense.	  Using	  the	  
tool	  alongside	  interviews	  aimed	  at	  understanding	  institutions	  in	  practice	  helped	  shed	  further	  
light	  on	  authority,	  responsibility	  and	  associated	  processes	  of	  biodiversity	  governance	  in	  the	  
study	  areas.	  
3.1	  Applying	  the	  Institutional	  Grammar	  Tool	  
The	   IGT	   was	   applied	   according	   to	   the	   empirical	   guidelines	   of	   Basurto	   et	   al.48	  and	  
including	  refinements	  made	  by	  Siddiki	  et	  al.49	  This	  was	  achieved	  by	  organising	   institutional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Basurto,	  X	  et	  al,	  "A	  Systematic	  Approach	  to	  Institutional	  Analysis:	  Applying	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom's	  Grammar"	  (2010)	  
63(3)	  Political	  Research	  Quarterly	  523	  at	  534	  
42	  Siddiki,	  S	  et	  al,	  "Dissecting	  Policy	  Designs:	  An	  Application	  of	  the	  Institutional	  Grammar	  Tool"	  (2011)	  39(1)	  Policy	  Studies	  
Journal	  79	  at	  98	  
43	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  n	  39	  at	  139-­‐140	  
44	  Basurto	  et	  al,	  n	  41,	  p	  528	  
45	  See	  for	  eg	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  n	  39	  at	  139;	  Siddiki	  et	  al,	  n	  42	  at	  98	  
46	  Siddiki,	  S,	  Basurto,	  X	  and	  Weible,	  CM,	  "Using	  the	  institutional	  grammar	  tool	  to	  understand	  regulatory	  compliance:	  The	  
case	  of	  Colorado	  aquaculture"	  (2012)	  6(2)	  Regulation	  &	  Governance	  16;	  Kamran,	  MA	  and	  Shivakoti,	  GP,	  "Comparative	  
institutional	  analysis	  of	  customary	  rights	  and	  colonial	  law	  in	  spate	  irrigation	  systems	  of	  Pakistani	  Punjab"	  (2013)	  38(5)	  
Water	  International	  601	  
47	  Crawford,	  S	  and	  Ostrom,	  E,	  "A	  Grammar	  of	  Institutions"	  (1995)	  89(3)	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  582	  
48	  Basurto	  et	  al.,	  n	  41	  at	  526	  
	  	  
statements	   into	   five	   subcomponents:	   Attribute	   (A),	   Deontic	   (D),	   aIm	   (I),	   Condition	   (C),	   Or	  
else	  (O)	  (alternatively	  called	  ADICO)50	  and	  the	  oBject	  (B)	  proposed	  by	  Siddiki	  et	  al51.	  (Table	  1).	  
The	  tool	  was	  only	  applied	  to	  portions	  of	  selected	  policy	  documents	  (see	  below)	  consisting	  of	  
institutional	  statements	  with	  the	  minimum	  AIC	  syntax.52	  
The	  subcomponents	  were	  modified	  as	  indicated	  in	  Table	  1.	  In	  this	  study	  the	  Deontics	  
of	   ‘will’	   and	   ‘must’	   are	   differentiated	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   Deontics	   draw	   on	   the	   linguistic	  
concept	  of	  mode,	  which	  describes	  a	  speaker’s	  attitude	  toward	  a	  situation.	  The	  words	   ‘will’	  
and	   ‘must’	   are	   qualitatively	   different	   in	   English,	   expressing	   different	   degrees	   of	   certainty.	  
‘Must’	  indicates	  a	  strong	  obligation,53	  whereas	  ‘will’	  hedges	  future	  actions	  and	  can	  portray	  a	  
lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  policy’s	  assertions.54	  The	  Condition	  field	  was	  expanded	  in	  this	  study	  
to	  include	  ‘why’	  elements,	  along	  with	  when,	  where,	  and	  how	  (Table	  1).	  This	  accommodated	  
language	  about	  why	  a	  particular	  action	  would	  be	  taken,	  e.g.	  “due	  to	  the	   international	  and	  
national	  significance	  of	  many	  of	  its	  values”.55	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Subcomponents	  of	  the	  IGT	  syntax	  including	  the	  modifications	  applied	  in	  this	  study	  
Sub-­‐
component*	  
Description	   Modification	  
Attribute	  (A)	   Individual	  or	  organization	  to	  which	  it	  applies	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Deontic	  (D)	   What	  is	  permitted,	  obliged,	  or	  forbidden	  
(e.g.	  must,	  may,	  shall,	  shall	  not,	  will)	  
‘Will’	  and	  ‘must’	  coded	  separately,	  
previously	  both	  coded	  as	  ‘must’	  	  
aIm	  (I)	   Goal	  or	  action	  to	  which	  D	  refers	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Condition	  (C)	   When,	  where,	  how	  or	  why	  the	  aim	  applies	   ‘Why’	  added	  to	  ‘when’,	  ‘where’,	  and	  
‘how’	  
Or	  else	  (O)	   Punitive	  action	  if	  rule	  is	  not	  adhered	  to	  (e.g.	  
fine)	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
oBject	  (B)	   Inanimate	  or	  animate	  part	  of	  a	  statement	  
that	  receives	  the	  action	  (e.g.	  plan	  or	  policy)	  
Introduced	  to	  resolve	  ambiguities	  in	  
grammar	  and	  allow	  for	  a	  clearer	  
distinction	  between	  actor	  and	  what	  
actor	  is	  acting	  upon	  	  
*	  This	  article	  maintains	  the	  naming	  conventions	  of	  each	  component	  throughout,	  e.g.	  ‘aIm’	  and	  ‘oBject’.	  
Sources:	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom	  (1995),	  see	  n	  47;	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom	  (2005),	  see	  n	  39;	  Basurto	  et	  al	  (2010),	  
see	  n	  41;	  Siddiki	  et	  al	  (2011),	  see	  n	  42.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  n	  42	  at	  88	  
50	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  n	  29	  at	  140-­‐152	  
51	  Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  n	  42	  at	  85	  
52	  Basurto	  et	  al.,	  n	  41	  at	  526;	  Siddiki	  et	  al.,	  n	  42	  at	  88	  
53	  Payne,	  TE,	  Describing	  morphosyntax:	  A	  guide	  for	  field	  linguists	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1997)	  p	  246	  
54	  Dunmire,	  PL,	  "The	  rhetoric	  of	  temporality'"	  in	  Barbara	  	  Johnstone	  and	  Christopher	  	  Eisenhart	  (eds),	  Rhetoric	  in	  Detail:	  
Discourse	  Analyses	  of	  Rhetorical	  Talk	  and	  Text	  (John	  Benjamins	  Publishing,	  2008)	  vol	  31,	  81-­‐111	  at	  pp	  94-­‐96	  
55	  NPWS,	  Plan	  of	  Management	  Kosciuszko	  National	  Park	  (Department	  of	  Environment	  and	  Conservation	  NSW,	  Sydney	  South,	  
NSW,	  2006)	  p	  46	  
	  	  
The	   grammatical	   syntax	   of	   the	   IGT	   is	   used	   to	   identify	   three	   types	   of	   institutional	  
statements:	   shared	   strategies,	   rules	   and	   norms	   (Table	   2).	   This	   provides	   insights	   into	   the	  
(often	   tacit)	   assumptions	   about	   how	   institutions	   are	   likely	   to	   guide	   behaviour	   to	   help	  
determine	   how	   policy	   choices	   are	   made.	   With	   shared	   strategies,	   actors	   have	   mutual	  
understandings	  and	  stable	  preferences	  that	  they	  pursue	  and	  optimise.	  Norms	  rely	  on	  shared	  
group	   perceptions	   with	   behaviour	   driven	   by	   identity	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   what	   is	   proper	   and	  
improper	   behaviour	   in	   a	   particular	   situation.56 	  Rules	   focus	   on	   prescribing,	   allowing,	   or	  
requiring	  actions	  and	  knowing	  there	  are	  consequences	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  Rules	  have	  the	  
strongest	  effect	  on	  behaviour,	  provided	  the	  rules	  are	  perceived	  as	  legitimate.57	  	  
Four	  biodiversity	  policy	  documents	  –	  two	  for	  each	  case	  study	  –	  central	  to	  biodiversity	  
conservation	  in	  these	  regions	  were	  selected	  for	  analysis	  using	  the	  IGT	  (Table	  3).	  They	  were	  
selected	   in	   consultation	  with	   two	   key	   informants	  with	   in-­‐depth	   knowledge	   of	   biodiversity	  
conservation	   in	   the	   case	   study	   regions.	   Crucially,	   all	   four	   documents	   are	   current,	   in	   use,	  
influential	   in	   decision-­‐making	   for	   conservation	   and	   at	   a	   landscape-­‐scale,	   and	   have	   a	  
statutory	  basis.58	  	  
Table	  2.	  Description	  of	  institutional	  statements	  






Statements	  that	  try	  to	  create	  mutual	  understandings	  as	  a	  way	  to	  guide	  
behaviour.	   Their	  effectiveness	   relies	  on	   stable	  actor	  preferences	  and	  
pursuing	  and	  optimizing	  these	  preferences.	  	  
AIC	  /	  ABIC	  
Norms	   Statements	   that	   rely	   on	   shared	   group	  perceptions	   of	  what	   is	   proper	  
and	   improper	   behaviour	   in	   a	   particular	   situation.	   They	   are	   most	  
effective	   when	   actors	   behave	   in	   ways	   that	   they	   believe	   are	   right,	  
proper,	  or	  consistent	  with	  their	  identity.	  
ADIC	  /	  ABDIC	  
Rules	   Statements	  and	  actions	  that	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  these	  prescriptions	  
are	   rendered	   ineffective	   or	   may	   be	   sanctioned	   by	   actors	   with	   the	  
authority	  to	  impose	  punishment.	  	  
ADICO	  /	  ABDICO	  
Sources:	   Crawford	   and	   Ostrom	   (1995),	   see	   n	   47;	   Young	   OR,	   The	   Institutional	   Dimensions	   of	   Environmental	  
Change:	   Fit,	   Interplay	   and	   Scale	   (MIT	   Press,	   Cambridge,	   2002)	   pp	   32-­‐37;	   March	   JG	   and	   Olsen	   JP,	   “The	  
Institutional	  Dynamics	  of	  International	  Political	  Orders”	  (1998)	  52(4)	  International	  Organization	  943	  at	  949.	  
	  
The	   two	  Midlands	  policies	   analysed	   relate	   to	   the	   irrigation	   scheme	   (Midlands	  Water	  
Scheme	   –	   MWS).	   The	   first	   is	   the	   Program	   Report	   for	   the	   MWS,59	  prepared	   to	   address	  
impacts	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  irrigation	  scheme.	  This	  document,	  prepared	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Crawford	  and	  Ostrom,	  n	  47	  at	  583	  
57	  Siddiki	  et	  al,	  n	  46	  at	  170	  
58	  A	  small	  number	  of	  policy	  documents	  was	  selected	  given	  application	  of	  the	  IGT	  is	  time	  consuming,	  particularly	  for	  large	  
documents.	  
59	  DPIPWE,	  Strategic	  Assessment	  for	  the	  Water	  Access	  Program	  Midlands	  Water	  Scheme,	  Tasmania,	  Program	  Report:	  
Environment	  Protection	  and	  Biodiversity	  Conservation	  Act	  1999,	  DPIPWE	  No	  	  (2011).	  
	  	  
by	  the	  Tasmanian	  Government,	  builds	  on	  the	  strategic	  environmental	  impact	  assessment,60	  
which	   identified	   high	   risks	   to	   listed	   grassland	   communities.	   The	   Program	   Report	   outlines	  
how	   the	   state	   of	   Tasmania	   will	   meet	   its	   commitment	   to	   no	   clearance	   and	   conversion	   of	  
listed	   grasslands	   (hereafter	   ‘program	   commitments’),	   and	   the	   federal	   Minister	   for	   the	  
Environment’s	  approval	  under	   the	  EPBC	  Act	   is	  contingent	  on	   that	  commitment	  being	  met.	  
Although	   the	   Tasmanian	   Department	   of	   Primary	   Industries,	   Parks	   Water	   &	   Environment	  
(DPIPWE)	   is	   responsible	   for	   this	   commitment,	   Tasmanian	   Irrigation	   (a	   state-­‐owned	  
corporation)	  will	   operate	   the	   Scheme;	   and	   landholders	   and	   pre-­‐	   qualified	   consultants	  will	  
play	   important	   roles	   at	   the	   property	   scale.	   The	   federal	   Minister	   for	   the	   Environment	  
approved	  the	  Program	  Report	  under	  Part	  10	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act.	  This	  section	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  
(i.e.,	  the	  enabling	  legislation)	  was	  the	  second	  policy	  analysed	  for	  the	  Midlands	  case	  study.	  
For	   the	  Australian	  Alps,	   the	  two	  documents	  selected	  focused	  on	  the	  management	  of	  
the	   parks.	   The	   Plan	   of	   Management	   for	   Kosciuszko	   National	   Park	   (PoM)61	  is	   a	   statutory	  
document	   expressing	   how	   the	   NPWS	   will	   meet	   its	   conservation	   and	   management	  
responsibilities.	   The	   Alps	   Strategic	   Plan,62 	  the	   second	   Alps	   document	   analysed,	   guides	  
actions	  of	  the	  cooperative	  program	  across	  all	  the	  jurisdictions,	  but	  is	  non-­‐statutory	  (Table	  3).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  DPIPWE,	  n	  34	  
61	  NPWS,	  n	  55	  
62	  AALC,	  Strategic	  Plan	  2012–2015	  for	  the	  Australian	  Alps	  national	  parks	  Co-­‐operative	  Management	  Program	  (Australian	  
Alps	  National	  Parks	  Co-­‐operative	  Management	  Program,	  Jindabyne,	  2011)	  	  
	  	  
Table	  3.	  Documents	  analysed	  with	  the	  IGT	  in	  this	  study	  
Policy	  
document	  
Study	  area	   Lead	  agency	   Statutory/Non-­‐
statutory	  










(Part	  10	  of	  the	  
EPBC	  Act)	  
Provides	  means	  to	  
meet	  program	  








actions	  to	  mitigate	  
impacts	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construction	  and	  
operation	  of	  the	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  on	  MNES.	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   Legal	  framework	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  to	  the	  
Australian	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  to	  
approve	  the	  MWS	  as	  












Statutory	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  5	  of	  the	  
National	  Parks	  




broad	  scope	  of	  work	  
for	  maintaining	  or	  
improving	  the	  
condition	  of	  the	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  significant	  
biodiversity	  
attributes,	  over	  the	  


















objectives	  of	  the	  
MOU	  and	  guides	  the	  










is	  no	  shared	  
legislation	  or	  
management	  plan,	  so	  
this	  is	  the	  only	  plan	  
covering	  the	  whole	  
bioregion.	  
*	  Analysis	  is	  only	  provided	  for	  Part	  5,	  the	  main	  section	  of	  the	  report	  containing	  institutional	  statements.	  
	  	  
3.2	   Conducting	  and	  analysing	  the	  interviews	  
A	   total	   of	   50	   semi-­‐structured,	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   were	   conducted.	   Interview	  
participants	   were	   selected	   using	   purposive	   sampling 63 	  to	   target	   individuals	   with	   an	  
implementation	   role	   in	   the	   organisations	   involved	   in	   the	   landscape-­‐scale	   biodiversity	  
conservation	   policies	   selected	   for	   analysis	   (Table	   4).	   An	   initial	   list	   of	   participants	   was	  
identified	   through	   research	   and	   policy	   contacts	   in	   each	   region	   and	   within	   the	   federal	  
government.	  Additional	  participants	  were	  determined	  through	  snowball	  sampling.64	  	  
Table	  4.	  Categories	  of	  interview	  participants	  
Category	   Midlands	  (n)	   Alps	  (n)	  
Australian	  Government	  	   7	   2	  
State	  or	  territory	  government	   7	   17	  
Landholders	  &	  peak	  farming	  body	   5	   N/A	  
NGOs	   and	   Regional	   Natural	   Resource	  
Management	  Groups*	  
4	   N/A	  
Other	   interests	   (e.g.	   researchers,	   irrigators,	  
hydro)	  
5	   3	  
Total	   28	   22	  
*	  These	  groups	  facilitate	  planning,	  delivery	  and	  implementation	  of	  integrated	  natural	  resource	  management	  in	  the	  54	  
catchments	  or	  bioregions	  in	  Australia.	  	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   implementation	   roles,	   for	   the	   Midlands	   policies	   participants	   needed	   to	  
have	   direct	   experience	   with	   strategic	   assessment,	   irrigation	   development,	   and/or	  
implementation	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act.	  Participants	  included	  the	  lead	  author	  of	  the	  MWS	  Program	  
Report,	  providing	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  of	  how	  the	  findings	  from	  applying	  the	  IGT	  
to	  this	  document	  aligned	  (or	  not)	  with	  the	  author’s	  original	  intention	  in	  crafting	  the	  report.	  
In	  the	  Australian	  Alps,	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  NPWS	  personnel	  (for	  the	  Kosciuszko	  
PoM)	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  cooperative	  program	  (for	  the	  Strategic	  Plan).	  
Importantly,	   these	   interviews	  were	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  diagnostic	  
exploring	   institutional	   fit	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   biodiversity	   conservation,65	  which	   extended	  
well	  beyond	   the	  policy	  documents	  analysed	  using	   the	   IGT.	  The	   interviews	   thus	  provided	  a	  
rich	   insight	   into	   decision-­‐making	   in	   practice.	   This	   is	   the	   first	   study	   to	   use	   the	   IGT	  
independent	  of	  the	  Institutional	  Analysis	  and	  Development	  (IAD)	  Framework,66	  using	  instead	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Babbie,	  ER,	  The	  practice	  of	  social	  research	  (12th	  ed,	  Wadsworth	  Cengage	  Learning,	  Belmont,	  2010)	  pp	  195-­‐196	  
64	  Atkinson,	  R	  and	  Flint,	  J,	  "Sampling,	  snowball:	  accessing	  hidden	  and	  hard-­‐to-­‐reach	  populations'"	  in	  Robert	  L.	  	  Miller	  and	  
John	  D.	  	  Brewer	  (eds),	  The	  A-­‐Z	  of	  Social	  Research	  (SAGE	  Publications,	  2003)	  275-­‐280	  at	  p	  275	  
65	  Young,	  OR,	  "Building	  regimes	  for	  socioecological	  systems:	  Institutional	  diagnostics'"	  in	  Oran	  R	  Young,	  Leslie	  A	  King	  and	  
Heike	  Schroeder	  (eds),	  Institutions	  and	  environmental	  change:	  principal	  findings,	  applications,	  and	  research	  frontiers	  (MIT	  
Press,	  2008)	  115-­‐144	  	  
66	  Ostrom,	  n	  38	  at	  1-­‐27	  
	  	  
an	   original	   conceptual	   framework	   based	   on	   the	   diagnostic	   approach.67	  Researchers	   have	  
suggested	  the	  tool	  can	  and	  should	  be	  used	  with	  frameworks	  other	  than	  the	   IAD,68	  but	  this	  
had	  not	  been	  done	  previously.	  
The	   interview	   transcripts	   were	   coded	   using	   a	   cross-­‐case	   approach	   to	   thematic	  
analysis,69	  focusing	  on	  roles,	  responsibilities,	  and	  authority.	  This	  set	  of	  a	  priori	  codes	  guided	  
the	   first	   level	   of	   analysis,	   followed	   by	   a	   second	   level	   of	   analysis	  where	   emergent	   themes	  
were	   identified	   by	   coding	   patterns	   in	   the	   data	   and	   then	   synthesised	   into	   themes	   across	  
cases.70	  These	   results	  were	   combined	  with	   those	   from	   the	   linguistic	   analysis	   to	   develop	   a	  
composite	  picture	  of	  policies-­‐in-­‐practice	  and	  -­‐on-­‐paper.	  
4	  	  Responsibility,	  accountability	  and	  authority	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation	  in	  an	  
agricultural	  landscape	  
Analysis	   of	   the	   policy	   documents	   and	   the	   diagnostic	   interview	   revealed	   a	   strong	  
reliance	  on	  norms,	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  about	  responsibilities,	  and	  issues	  regarding	  accountability	  
and	   authority	   in	   the	   Midlands	   agricultural	   landscape.	   A	   perceived	   and	   actual	   lack	   of	  
authority	   combined	   with	   procedural	   rather	   than	   outcome-­‐focused	   policy	   design	   raises	  
interesting	   implications	   for	  biodiversity	  conservation	  and	  the	  policy	  adjustments	  necessary	  
to	  promulgate	  it.	  	  
Norms	  dominated	  the	  Midlands	  documents,	  with	  89%	  and	  84%	  of	  the	  statements	  analysed	  
using	   the	   IGT	   being	   norm-­‐based,	   rather	   than	   strategy-­‐	   or	   rule-­‐based	   (Table	   2,	   Table	   5).	  
Virtually	  no	   rule-­‐based	   statements	  were	  evident.	  A	  norms-­‐based,	   ‘soft’	   approach	   to	  policy	  
implementation	   was	   also	   evident	   through	   the	   Deontic	   and	   aIms	   analyses	   using	   the	   IGT	  
(Table	   1,	   Table	   5	   rows	   7	   &	   8).	   The	   word	   ‘will’	   was	   the	   dominant	   Deontic	   in	   one	   of	   the	  
Midlands	   documents;	   a	   word	   suggesting	   uncertainty	   about	   future	   implementation.71	  Even	  
when	  the	  stronger	  Deontic	  ‘must’	  appeared	  dominant	  from	  analysis	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  it	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  weak	  aIms	  (e.g.	  provide,	  consider,	  facilitate)	  (Table	  5).	  Taken	  together	  with	  
the	   dominance	   of	   norms,	   the	   coding	   highlights	   institutional	   	   arrangements	   built	   on	   soft	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Clement,	  S	  et	  al,	  "A	  diagnostic	  framework	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation	  institutions"	  (2015)	  (under	  review)	  Pacific	  
Conservation	  Biology	  
68	  See	  eg	  Siddiki	  et	  al,	  n	  42	  at	  98-­‐99	  
69	  Babbie,	  n	  63	  at	  395-­‐406	  
70	  Creswell,	  JW,	  Qualitative	  inquiry	  and	  research	  design:	  choosing	  among	  five	  approaches	  (3rd	  ed,	  SAGE	  Publications,	  
Thousand	  Oaks,	  2013)	  pp	  185-­‐200	  
71	  Dunmire,	  n	  54	  at	  94-­‐96	  
	  	  
approaches,	  underpinned	  by	  shared	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  proper	  or	  improper	  behaviour,	  
rather	  than	  sanctions	  and	  rewards.	  	  
	  
Table	  5.	  Summary	  of	  coding	  results	  for	  each	  document	  
Component	   Tasmanian	   Midlands	  
Program	  Report	  	  
Part	  10	  EPBC	  Act	   PoM	  for	  Kosciuszko	  
NP	  
Alps	  Strategic	  Plan	  	  
Number	   of	  
Shared	  
Strategies	  
10	  (10%)	   5	  (16%)	   680	  (69%)	   122	  (51%)	  
Number	   of	  
Norms	  
90	  (89%)	   27	  (84%)	   310	  (31%)	   119	  (49%)	  
Number	   of	  
Rules	  
1	  (1%)	   0	   0	   0	  
Total	   Number	  
of	  Statements	  
101	   32	   990	   241	  




Government	   (32)	  
[21	  implied]	  
• Water	  entity*	  (30)	  	  
[23	  implied]	  
• Australian	  
Government	   (17)	   [8	  
implied]	  
• DPIPWE	   (9)	   [4	  
implied]	  
• Minister	   for	   the	  
Environment	   (26)	  
[8	  implied]	  
• All	   actors	   to	   which	  
the	   Act	   applies	  
[default	   -­‐	   implied]	  
(5)	  
• NPWS	   (924)	   [914	  
implied]	  
• Lessees	   or	  
licensees	   in	   the	  
ski	   resort	   areas	  
(22)	  
• Program	   Manager	  
(43)	  	  
[38	  implied]	  
• Reference	   groups	  
(35)	  	  
[30	  implied]	  
• AALC	  (29)	  	  
[14	  implied]	  
Most	   common	  
aIms	  
• Monitor	  (31)	  
• Identify	  (8)	  
• Approve	  (6)	  
• Provide	  (6)	  
• Apply	  (4)	  
• Act	  (3)	  
• Consider	  (3)	  
• Manage	  (70)	  
• Ensure	  (59)	  
• Provide	  (40)	  
• Provide	  (14)	  	  
• Advise	  (9)	  
• Facilitate	  (9)	  
	  
All	  Deontics	   • Will	  (52)	  
• Must	   (26)	   [23	  
implied]	  
• May	   (9)	   [4	   of	   which	  
implied]	  
• Must	   not	   (2)	   [both	  
implied]	  
• Must	  (12)	  
• May	  (9)	  
• Must	  not	  (6)	  
• Will	   (149)	   [6	  
implied]	  
• May	   (74)	   [42	  
implied]	  
• Must	   not	   (37)	   [26	  
of	  which	  implied]	  
• Must	   (26)	   [21	  
implied]	  
• Will	   not	   (12)	   [1	  
implied]	  
• Do	  not	  (5)	  
• Should	  (4)	  
• Will	   (90)	   [20	  
implied]	  
• May	  (20)	  
• Must	   (5)	   [3	  
implied]	  
• Should	  (3)	  
• Will	  not	  (1)	  
• Would	  (1)	  
	  
• This	   is	   presently	   Tasmanian	   Irrigation,	   but	   the	   Tasmanian	   Minister	   for	   the	   Environment	   may	   declare	   another	   entity	  
responsible	  to	  the	  Scheme	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  report	  thus	  uses	  the	  broader	  term	  ‘water	  entity’	  to	  ensure	  the	  policy	  still	  
applies	  even	  if	  the	  responsible	  party	  changes.	  
	  	  
Interviewees	  consistently	  confirmed	  a	  reliance	  on	  norms	  over	  rules	  in	  practice	  as	  well	  
as	  on	  paper	  as	   revealed	  by	   the	   IGT	  analysis.	  For	  example	   in	   interviews,	  when	  asked	  about	  
the	   source	   of	   their	   authority	   to	   conserve	   biodiversity,	   both	   government	   and	   non-­‐
government	   members	   said	   it	   was	   through	   working	   with	   landholders	   to	   develop	   shared	  
strategies	  and	  trust.	  Statutory	  authority	  was	  secondary.	  As	  one	  Tasmanian	  participant	  put	  it,	  
the	   general	   sense	   was	   regulation	   would	   not	   protect	   the	   grasslands.	   It’s	   actually	   about	  
appropriate	   management	   that	   implements	   biodiversity	   conservation	   into	   those	   systems.	  
With	   trust	   and	   goodwill,	   working	  with	   the	   landholders.	  Many	   interviewees	   feared	   actions	  
over	  the	  previous	  few	  years	  had	  undermined	  trust,	   including	   inadequate	  consultation	  with	  
the	  State	  government	  and	  landholders	  regarding	  federal	  listing	  of	  the	  grasslands	  under	  the	  
EPBC	   Act	   and	   the	   sharp	   political	   divide	   between	   conservation	   and	   use	   of	   resources	   in	  
Tasmania	  (i.e.	  ‘greenies’	  versus	  industry).	  	  
When	  asked	  about	  the	  high	  number	  of	  norm	  statements	  in	  the	  Midlands	  documents,	  
one	  interviewee	  noted:	  if	  you	  want	  to	  get	  to	  the	  point	  where	  you've	  got	  80-­‐90%	  rules,	  versus,	  
10%	   norms,	   there's	   a	   heap	   of	   up-­‐front	   consultation	   you've	   got	   to	   go	   through	   to	   get	  
agreement	   on	   understanding,	   and	   to	   get	   agreement	   on	   those	   outcomes.	   The	  
aforementioned	  tight	  timelines	  accompanying	  the	  Program	  Report	  made	  such	  negotiations	  
difficult,	   as	   did	   the	   State	   government’s	   reluctant	   participation	   in	   the	   strategic	   assessment	  
process,	  large	  because	  it	  was	  a	  condition	  of	  federal	  funding.	  Norms	  have	  weaker	  effects	  on	  
behaviour	  than	  rules,	  and	  compliance	  is	  greatest	  with	  ‘must’	  statements.72	  If	  compliance	  is	  a	  
desired	  end	  point,	  as	   it	   is	  with	  the	  Program	  Report,	   then	  a	  reliance	  on	  norms,	   rather	   than	  
rules	  with	  sanctions,	  may	  not	  lead	  to	  this	  end	  point.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Program	  Report,	  non-­‐
compliance	  could	  compromise	  the	  program	  commitments.	  	  
This	  ‘soft’	  approach	  with	  its	  reliance	  on	  norms	  was	  also	  evident	  through	  implied	  rather	  
than	   explicit	   Attributes	   (i.e.	   an	   individual	   or	   organisation)	   (Table	   1,	   Table	   5).	   Rather	   than	  
explicitly	  defining	  responsible	  parties	  in	  each	  statement,	  both	  
of	  the	  Midlands	  documents	  were	  dominated	  by	  implied	  Attributes.	  Frequent	  use	  of	  passive	  
voice	   meant	   implication	   was	   not	   always	   straight	   forward,	   though	   the	   surrounding	   text	  
helped	   identify	   the	  Attribute.	  This	   task	  was	  challenging,	  however,	   for	   the	  Program	  Report,	  
with	   the	  responsible	  parties	  clearly	   identified	   in	  one	  part	  of	   the	  document,	  but	  difficult	   to	  
discern	  in	  the	  monitoring	  and	  implementation	  section.	  Clear	  links	  to	  program	  commitments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Ostrom,	  n	  38	  at	  152;	  Siddiki	  et	  al,	  n	  46	  at	  180	  
	  	  
in	   the	   latter	   section	   were	   also	   lacking.	   This	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   clearly	   delineate	  
responsibilities	  and	  roles	  and	  determine	  who	  was	  accountable	  for	  what	  (and	  to	  whom).	  
Clarity	   of	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   also	   emerged	   as	   an	   issue	   in	   the	   interviews.	  
Responsibilities	  for	  monitoring	  and	  evaluation	  were	  especially	  problematic.	  For	  the	  Program	  
Report,	   now	   in	   the	   implementation	   phase,	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   are	   still	   being	  
negotiated.	   Some	   participants	   were	   concerned	   that	   politically	   driven,	   short	   timeframes	  
prevented	  sufficient	  negotiation	  and	  consultation	  prior	  to	  submitting	  the	  Program	  Report	  for	  
Ministerial	  approval.	   Interviewees	  commented	  that	  Tasmanian	   Irrigation	  has	  been	  hesitant	  
to	   take	   responsibility	   for	   landscape-­‐level	   monitoring	   of	   the	   impacts	   of	   irrigation	  
development	   on	   biodiversity,	   as	   the	   state	   conducted	   the	   strategic	   assessment	   on	   their	  
behalf	  and	  attributing	  the	  source	  of	  biodiversity	   impacts	  at	  that	  scale	  is	  difficult.	  While	  the	  
State	   has	   accepted	   responsibility	   for	   monitoring,	   several	   interviewees	   highlighted	   its	  
reluctance	  to	  do	  so,	  especially	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  adequate	  resources.	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Program	  Report	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
current	   EPBC	   Act	   that	   guided	   the	   crafting	   of	   the	   Program	   Report	   and	   guides	   biodiversity	  
conservation	  more	   generally,	   formally	   limiting	   federal	   involvement	   to	  MNES.	   The	   narrow	  
scope	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  has	  been	  called	  the	  ‘dark	  side’	  of	  the	  Act’s	  ‘virtue’	  and	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
the	  aforementioned	  tensions	  of	  cooperative	  federalism	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  constrain	  federal	  
power.73	  While	   strategic	   assessment	   has	   been	   posed	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   narrow	   scope	   of	  
assessment	   under	   the	   EPBC	   Act	   and	   a	   key	   strategy	   in	   shifting	   to	   landscape	   scale,74	  the	  
objects	  and	  content	  of	  the	  Act	  remains	  focused	  on	  MNES.	  
A	  strong	  focus	  on	  policy	  process	  rather	  than	  policy	  outcomes	  was	  evident	   from	  both	  
the	   IGT	   and	   diagnostic	   interview	   analyses.	   Analysis	   of	   statements	   in	   the	   two	   Midlands	  
policies	   regarding	   ‘when,	  where,	   how	  and	  why	   the	  aim	  applies’	   (Table	  1	   row	  5:	  Condition	  
sub-­‐component)75	  revealed	   emphasis	   on	   how	   the	   aim	   should	   be	   achieved,	   generally	   a	  
process,	  instead	  of	  when	  or	  where.	  This	  applied	  to	  all	  documents,	  even	  Part	  10	  of	  the	  EBPC	  
Act,	   which	   specified	   processes	   for	   entering	   into	   agreements	   to	   conduct	   strategic	  
assessments	  in	  detail,	  for	  example:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Godden,	  L	  and	  Peel,	  J,	  "The	  Environment	  Protection	  and	  Biodiversity	  Conservation	  Act	  1999	  (Cth):	  Dark	  Sides	  of	  Virtue"	  
(2007)	  31(1)	  Melbourne	  Law	  Review	  106	  at	  134-­‐142	  
74	  	  Hawke,	  n	  6	  at	  2	  
75	  These	  results	  are	  not	  included	  in	  Table	  5	  because	  of	  their	  length	  and	  discursive	  nature.	  	  
	  	  
for	  the	  assessment	  of	  other	  certain	  and	  likely	  impacts	  of	  actions	  under	  the	  policy,	  plan	  
or	  program	  if:	  (a)	  the	  actions	  are	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  a	  State	  or	  self	  governing	  Territory;	  and	  
(b)	   the	   appropriate	   Minister	   of	   the	   State	   or	   Territory	   has	   asked	   the	   Minister	  
administering	  this	  section	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  assessment	  deal	  with	  those	  other	  impacts	  
to	  help	   the	   State	  or	   Territory,	   or	  an	  agency	  of	   the	   State	  or	   Territory,	  make	  decisions	  
about	  the	  actions…	  	  
This	   single	   Condition	   statement	   continues	  with	   several	  more	   sub-­‐Conditions	   that	   all	  
are	   part	   of	   processes	   for	   establishing	   these	   agreements.	   Analysis	   of	   the	   oBject	   sub-­‐
component76	  of	  the	   IGT	  (Table	  1,	  row	  6)	  also	  suggests	  an	  emphasis	  on	  process	  rather	  than	  
outcomes,	  with	  Part	  10	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  having	  written	  comments,	  advice,	  or	  agreements	  as	  
oBjects.	   For	   the	   Tasmanian	   Midlands	   Program	   Report,	   oBjects	   frequently	   referred	   to	  
program	  requirements,	  such	  as	  Farm	  Water	  Access	  Plans	  (FWAPs),	  monitoring,	  and	  auditing	  
procedures.	  	  
Interviewees	  corroborated	  the	  procedural	   focus	  of	   the	   IGT	  findings,	  and	  married	  this	  
with	  concerns	   regarding	  accountability.	  They	  noted	   that	  processes	   such	  as	  FWAPs	  were	   in	  
place	   to	   achieve	   the	   program	   commitments,	   but	   these	   processes	   were	   faltering	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   clear	   accountabilities.	   This	   was	   a	   persistent	   problem	   for	   the	   MWS	   and	   its	  
associated	   policies,	   the	   Program	   Report	   and	   strategic	   assessment:	   If	   you	   don’t	   have	   clear	  
accountability	  and	  don’t	  have	  clear	  objectives,	  then	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  tool	  will	  apply,	  it	  
will	   all	   just	   be	   a	   bit	   of	   a	   mess	   (Australian	   Government	   participant).	   Problems	   with	  
accountability	  were	  noted	   in	  many	   interviews:	   It’s	  not	  clear	  what	  has	   to	  be	   reported,	  who	  
has	   to	   report	   it,	  what	   the	  annual	   report	   is	  –	  and	   I	   just	  don’t	   think	   it’s	  as	  good	  as	  what	  we	  
normally	  do	  (Tasmanian	  Participant).	  	  
Many	   interviewees	   perceived	   either	   a	   lack	   of	   authority	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   willingness	   to	  
deploy	   authority	   to	   protect	   the	   Midlands	   landscape	   from	   further	   degradation.	   Although	  
most	   interviewees	   were	   aware	   of	   the	   Tasmanian	   Government’s	   commitment	   to	   no	  
clearance	  or	  conversion	  of	  listed	  grasslands,	  concerns	  centred	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  governmental	  
authority	   was	   linked	   only	   to	   grasslands	   listed	   under	   the	   EPBC	   Act	   and	   not	   to	   conserving	  
ecosystems:	  They'll	  leave	  that	  little	  bit	  of	  grassland.	  	  Everything	  else	  around	  it	  can	  be	  cleared	  
and	   converted	   to	   beautiful	   poppies	   [under	   irrigation].	   It's	   useless	   (Tasmanian	   Participant).	  
Australian	  Government	  participants	  also	  acknowledged	  the	  narrowness	  of	  their	  authority,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Like	  the	  Condition	  data,	  the	  oBject	  data	  were	  also	  discursive	  and	  extensive	  and	  hence	  are	  not	  included	  in	  Table	  5.	  	  
	  	  
discussed	   previously	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   narrow	   scope	   and	   associated	   narrowness	   of	  
responsibilities	  under	  the	  EPBC	  Act.	  In	  absence	  of	  legislative	  reform,	  looking	  to	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  
for	  authority	  is	  insufficient	  for	  landscape-­‐scale	  efforts,	  requiring	  that	  authority	  be	  gained	  and	  
maintained	   through	   other	   means,	   such	   as	   through	   the	   acceptance	   and	   support	   of	  
stakeholders.77	  	  
A	  constraint	  on	  authority	  in	  the	  Program	  Report	  is	  ministerial	  discretion.	  With	  dozens	  
of	  pieces	  of	   legislation	  beyond	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  applying	  to	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  
the	  MWS,	  several	  ministers	  are	  involved,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  powers.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
‘may’	  and	  other	  hedging	  language	  was:	  partly	  because	  we	  can't	  fetter	  our	  Minister.	  We	  can't	  
put	  another	  piece	  of	  policy	   in	  place	   that	   requires	  him	  to	  do	  something	   that,	  under	  his	  Act;	  
he's	  got	  discretion	  over	  (Tasmanian	  Participant).	  Whether	  that	  discretion	  would	  be	  used	  to	  
act	   if	   monitoring	   mechanisms	   detected	   a	   problem	   was	   an	   open	   question	   for	   many	  
participants,	   who	   thought	   the	   political	   will	   was	   in	   favour	   of	   development.	   The	   political	  
pressure	  to	  ensure	  the	  Scheme	  was	  developed,	  and	  the	  sense	  by	  some	  participants	  that	  the	  
Strategic	   Assessment	   was	   more	   a	   ‘tick	   box’	   exercise,	   echoes	   problems	   elsewhere,	   where	  
conservation	  policy	  may	  not	  only	  weaken	  under	  economic	  pressure,	  but	  be	  actively	  used	  to	  
pursue	  a	  development	  agenda.78	  	  	  
An	  emphasis	  on	  procedure	  again	  emerged	  in	  discussions	  of	  authority.	  Two	  procedures	  
at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Program	  Report	  are	  development	  of	  FWAPs	  for	  managing	  environmental	  
impacts	  on	   individual	   farms,	  and	   landscape-­‐scale	  monitoring	   to	  ensure	   these	  smaller	   scale	  
impacts	  do	  not	   trigger	   cumulative	  ecological	   impacts	  at	   larger	   scales.	   It	   is	   still	   early	   in	   the	  
implementation	   of	   the	   program,	   but	   weaknesses	   in	   the	   procedures	   were	   revealed	   early	  
when	   the	   process	   of	   legislative	   approvals	   was	   not	   followed	   as	   outlined	   in	   the	   Program	  
Report.	  Deviations	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  raised	  questions	  for	  some	  interviewees	  about	  whether	  
the	   State	   or	   federal	   government	  would	   use	   this	   authority	   to	   ensure	   compliance	  with	   the	  
Program	   Report.	   Although	   a	   few	   participants	   considered	   the	   federal	   government	   more	  
willing	   to	  use	  command-­‐and-­‐control	   than	   the	  state,	  many	  participants	   remained	  uncertain	  
about	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  will	  or	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  exert	  authority	  early	  enough	  to	  
avert	   significant	   impacts.	   Many	   participant	   concerns	   echoed	   those	   in	   the	   literature	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Lockwood,	  above	  n	  18	  at	  758	  
78	  Apostolopoulou,	  E	  and	  Pantis,	  JD,	  "Development	  plans	  versus	  conservation:	  explanation	  of	  emergent	  conflicts	  and	  state	  
political	  handling"	  (2010)	  42(4)	  Environment	  and	  planning	  A	  982	  at	  997	  
	  	  
regulatory	   capture; 79 	  a	   problem	   made	   more	   acute	   by	   DPIPWE’s	   dual	   role	   in	   primary	  
industries	   and	   environmental	   conservation.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   critiques	   that	  
government’s	   deep	   involvement	   in	   fostering	   economic	   development	   shapes	   Australian	  
environmental	  policy.80	  
This	  tension	  between	  wanting	  strong	  authority	  as	  well	  as	  a	  norm-­‐based	  approach	  was	  
evident	   from	   many	   interviews.	   As	   one	   interviewee	   noted:	   I	   think	   it’s	   quite	   schizophrenic	  
actually,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  some	  things	  it’s	  all	  about	  what	  they	  [landholders]	  want,	  i.e.	  water	  
for	   example…But	   then	   something	   like	   the	   grasslands	   listing,	   there	   was	   basically	   no	  
consultation	  at	  all,	  it	  was	  just	  like	  ‘we’re	  listing	  it	  and	  that’s	  it’.	  This	  highlights	  the	  Janus	  face	  
of	  biodiversity	  governance,	  where,	  despite	  the	  rhetoric,	  governance-­‐beyond-­‐government	   is	  
not	  necessarily	  more	  democratic81.	  
While	   rules	   may	   be	   a	   less	   viable	   source	   of	   compliance	   in	   network	   governance	  
situations	  like	  the	  Midlands,82	  regulation	  can	  provide	  an	  important	  safety	  net	  for	  biodiversity	  
as	   a	   public	   good.83	  Participants	   found	   weaknesses	   in	   this	   safety	   net,	   based	   on	   issues	   of	  
responsibility	   and	   authority,	   making	   them	   uncertain	   about	   the	   future	   of	   biodiversity	  
conservation	  in	  the	  Midlands.	  To	  remedy	  this,	  some	  wanted	  a	  broader	  statutory	  framing	  of	  
the	   biodiversity	   values	   to	   be	   protected	   (e.g.	   ecological	   processes,	   action	   on	   the	   causes	   of	  
loss)	  and	  formal	  allocation	  of	  responsibilities	  and	  authority	  that	  is	  both	  broader	  and	  stronger.	  
It	   is	   perhaps	   unsurprising	   that	   responsibilities	   and	   authority	   in	   this	   landscape,	   with	  
respect	   to	   biodiversity	   conservation,	   are	   unclear	   and	   contested.	   This	   is	   not	   just	   because	  
there	   was	   little	   time	   for	   negotiation	   amid	   strong	   political	   drivers,	   but	   also	   because	   of	  
Australia’s	  complex	  system	  of	  cooperative	  federalism.84	  There	  are	  many	  implications	  of	  this	  
system	   for	   environmental	   governance;	   but	   for	   the	   Midlands	   the	   contested	   area	   of	   state	  
sovereignty	  and	  policy	  implementation	  is	  further	  complicated	  in	  an	  era	  of	  increasing	  federal	  
influence,	   especially	   through	   financial	   means,	   as	   in	   other	   Australian	   jurisdictions.85	  One	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concerned	   Tasmanian	   participant	   claimed	   the	   federal	   government	   approach	   to	  
implementing	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  was	  “borderline	  ultra	  vires”.	  Though	  Part	  10	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  is	  
discretionary,	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  able	  to	  essentially	  require	  a	  strategic	  assessment	  
by	  making	  funding	  contingent	  upon	  completion	  of	  such	  an	  assessment	  under	  this	  legislative	  
provision.	  These	  clashes	  raise	  concerns	  and	  questions	  for	  most	  participants	  about	  who	  has	  
authority	   and	   responsibility,	   with	   this	   lack	   of	   clarity	   further	   confounded	   by	   the	   ‘soft’	  
procedurally-­‐oriented	  policy	  language	  evidenced	  through	  the	  IGT	  analyses.	  	  
5	  	  Responsibility,	  accountability	  and	  authority	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation	  in	  a	  
national	  parks	  landscape	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	  Midlands	   findings,	   the	   Alps	   analyses	   revealed	   a	   reliance	   on	   both	  
strategies	   and	  norms.	  A	   focus	  on	  process	   rather	   than	  outcomes	  and	   concerns	   regarding	  a	  
lack	   of	   clarity	   in	   responsibility	   and	   authority	   were	   shared	   with	   the	   Midlands.	   Regarding	  
authority,	   both	   case	   studies	   illustrate	   jurisdictional	   concerns,	   but	   playing	   out	   in	   very	  
different	  ways.	  For	   the	  Midlands,	   the	   jurisdictional	   issues	   relate	   to	  who	   is	   responsible	  and	  
who	  has	   the	   authority,	  with	   evident	   tension	  between	   federal	   and	   State	   governments.	   For	  
the	   Alps,	   concerns	   relate	   to	   limited	   authority	   to	   cohesively	   manage	   biodiversity	   across	  
borders	   when	   responsibilities	   are	   spatially	   limited	   (i.e.	   within	   states	   and	   the	   ACT)	   and	  
politically	  influenced.	  	  
Shared	   strategies	   were	   more	   a	   feature	   of	   the	   Alps	   documents	   (69%	   and	   51%	   of	  
statements)	  compared	  to	  the	  norms	  dominating	  the	  Tasmanian	  documents,	  although	  norms	  
still	   comprised	   49%	   of	   the	   statements	   for	   the	   Alps	   Strategic	   Plan	   (Table	   2,	   Table	   5).	   A	  
complementary	  finding	  was	  the	  word	  ‘will’	  as	  the	  dominant	  Deontic	  in	  both	  Alps	  documents	  
(Table	   5);	   a	   word	   suggesting	   some	   uncertainty	   about	   implementation.	   Both	   the	   Alps	  
documents	  are	  aspirational	  planning	  documents	  hence	  the	  softer	  language	  and	  reliance	  on	  
norms	  and	  shared	  strategies.	  
The	   language	   in	   these	   documents	   conveys	   uncertainty	   in	   whether	   the	   institutional	  
statements	   will	   be	   achieved,	   not	   just	   because	   of	   the	   dominant	   Deontic	   (‘will’),	   but	   also	  
because	   of	   the	   linguistic	   mode.	   For	   both	   case	   studies,	   the	   language	   used	   in	   the	   policy	  
documents	   generally	   fell	   into	   the	   irrealis	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum,	   where	   the	   irrealis	   mode	  
makes	   no	   claims	   about	   truth	   or	   whether	   an	   event	   or	   state	   of	   affairs	   actually	   occurred,86	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  Payne,	  n	  53	  at	  244-­‐248	  
	  	  
seeking	  instead	  to	  manipulate	  future	  behaviour.87	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  linguistic	  spectrum	  
is	  the	  realis	  mode	  asserting	  that	  a	  specific	  event	  or	  state	  of	  affairs	  has	  actually	  happened	  or	  
is	  true.	  Though	  there	  has	  been	  little	  research	  in	  this	  area,	  the	  irrealis	  mode	  has	  been	  posited	  
as	  a	  common	   linguistic	   feature	  of	  policy,	  which	  must	  often	  regulate	  over	   long	  stretches	  of	  
time	  and	  space,	  thus	  driving	  a	  focus	  on	  potentiality	  rather	  than	  actuality.88	  
Although	  there	  was	  a	  large	  number	  of	  implied,	  rather	  than	  explicit,	  Attributes	  defining	  
responsibilities	  in	  the	  Alps	  documents	  (Table	  5),	  these	  were	  much	  easier	  to	  infer	  because	  of	  
the	  small	  number	  of	  organisations	  with	  responsibilities	  in	  this	  protected	  area	  landscape.	  For	  
example,	  the	  PoM	  for	  Kosciuszko	  NP	  had	  924	  occurrences	  of	  the	  park	  management	  agency	  
(NPWS)	   as	   the	   Attribute,	   914	   of	   which	   were	   implied.	   As	   the	   party	   with	   clear	   statutory	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  PoM,	  however,	  it	  was	  straightforward	  to	  identify	  the	  Attribute.	  
While	  on	  paper	  responsibility	  and	  authority	   in	  the	  Alps	  seems	  simple,	   in	  practice	  the	  
situation	  is	  more	  complicated.	  For	  example,	  regarding	  the	  PoM	  for	  Kosciuszko,	  interviewees	  
noted	  that	  the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  NPWS	  diverge	  significantly	   in	  practice,	  with	  
the	  plan	  providing	  more	  a	  ‘wish	  list’	  than	  a	  useful	  guide.	  While	  the	  plan	  provides	  objectives	  
and	   priorities	   for	   on-­‐ground	  management,	   in	   reality	  managers	   face	   limited	   budgets,	   staff	  
capacity,	   and	   politically	   driven	   imperatives	   such	   as	   prescribed	   burning.	   Regarding	   political	  
imperatives,	  one	  NSW	  participant	  commented:	  The	  working	  groups	  within	  the	  organisation	  
[AALC]	  probably	  are	  not	  fully	  aware	  of	  just	  how	  much	  pressure	  that	  can	  be	  exerted	  from	  the	  
Minister’s	   level…We	  might	   have	   arguments	   on	   how	   the	   Park	   should	   be	  managed…but	  we	  
can’t	  go	  on	  doing	  that	  without	  implementing	  the	  directions	  of	  the	  government	  of	  the	  day.	  
Prescribed	   burning	   of	   a	   percentage	   of	   the	   Alps	   each	   year	   has	   been	   politically	  
mandated	  by	  the	  State	  Governments	  of	  Victoria	  and	  NSW.	  This	  policy	  decision	  is	  in	  response	  
to	  catastrophic	  Victorian	  bushfires	   in	  2009.	  Rather	   than	  working	   to	  meet	   the	  conservation	  
objectives	   laid	  out	   in	  written	  policies,	   interviewees	  expressed	  concern	  they	  were	  spending	  
large	  amounts	  of	  time	  on	  prescribed	  burning,	  largely	  to	  achieve	  non-­‐conservation	  objectives.	  
This	   not	   only	   funnels	   resources	   away	   from	   conservation	   activities,	   but	   also	   has	   created	  
concerns	  about	  the	  potentially	  negative	  effects	  of	  these	  activities	  on	  biodiversity.	  In	  contrast	  
to	   the	  Midlands,	   the	   concern	  here	  was	  not	   about	   the	   clarity	  of	   responsibilities,	   but	   about	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which	  responsibilities	  are	  more	  important:	  responding	  to	  community	  and	  political	  concerns	  
about	  bushfires	  or	  protecting	  the	  values	  of	  the	  national	  parks.	  This	  is	  a	  perennial	  concern	  in	  
public	   administration,	   where	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   ‘let	   the	   managers	   manage’	   which	   is	  
undermined	   by	   efforts	   from	   political	   and	   higher	   level	   authorities	   to	   ‘make	   the	  managers	  
manage’.89	  While	  this	  is	  often	  posed	  as	  a	  way	  to	  keep	  agencies	  accountable,	  it	  can	  obscure	  
substantive	  responsibilities.90	  	  
While	  the	  NPWS	  has	  formal	  authority	  to	  implement	  the	  Kosciuszko	  PoM,	  increasingly	  
its	  actions	  are	  linked	  not	  to	  this	  statutory	  document,	  but	  to	  political	  priorities.	  Although	  the	  
NPWS	   develops	   operational	   plans	   to	   implement	   the	   PoM,	   these	   operational	   activities	   are	  
increasingly	   driven	   by	   corporate	   priorities	   originating	   beyond	   the	   PoM	   and	   from	   other	  
political	   arenas.	   One	   priority	   consistently	   raised	   by	   interviewees	  was	   a	   strong	   interest	   by	  
NSPW	  in	  improving	  their	  customer	  service,	  our	  push	  at	  the	  moment	  is	  all	  customer	  service,	  
customer	   service,	   customer	   relations	  –	  how	  does	  everyone	   think	  you’re	   really	  good.	   I	   think	  
science	   as	   underpinning	   work	   is	   disappearing,	   because	   it’s	   becoming	   “what’s	   the	  
community’s	  view?”	  (NSW	  Participant).	  Some	  interviewees	  thought	  this	  was	  related	  to	  a	  lack	  
of	  public	   support	   for	  parks,	   and	   that	   the	  agency	  was	   increasingly	  driven	  by	  public	  opinion	  
and	  political	  influence	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  that	  support.	  Interviewees	  commented	  that	  NPWS	  
was	   focusing	   on	   being	   a	   ‘good	   neighbour’	   (e.g.	  wild	   dog	   control,	   prescribed	   burning)	   and	  
with	   the	   limited	   resources	  available	   this	  was	   resulting	   in	   few	  resources	  being	  available	   for	  
PoM	  implementation.	  	  
A	   focus	   on	   processes	   rather	   than	   biodiversity	   outcomes	   was	   evident	   from	   the	   Alps	  
analyses,	   as	   was	   also	   the	   case	   for	   the	   Midlands.	   In	   applying	   the	   IGT	   and	   assessing	   the	  
Condition	   sub-­‐component	   (Table	   1,	   row	   5)	   it	   was	   evident	   that,	   again	   similarly	   to	   the	  
Midlands,	   how	   an	   aIm	   should	   be	   achieved	   (generally	   described	   as	   a	   process	   rather	   than	  
when	  or	  where)	  was	   the	   focus	  of	   the	  policy	   statements.	  The	  oBject	  analysis	  using	   the	   IGT	  
also	  revealed	  a	  process	  focus.	  This	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  for	  the	  Alps	  Strategic	  Plan,	  where	  
the	   oBjects	   ranged	   from	   improving	   management,	   to	   enhancing	   cooperation	   and	   learning	  
across	  borders,	  and	  to	  better	  engaging	  the	  community	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  Less	  process	  
oriented	   but	   just	   as	  wide	   ranging	  were	   the	   oBjects	   for	   the	   Kosciuszko	   PoM,	   ranging	   from	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features	  of	   the	  Park	   (e.g.	   geological	  attributes,	   infrastructure)	   to	  groups	  and	  organisations	  
(e.g.	  ski	  resort	  lessees	  and	  user	  groups).	  
Authority	  was	  clearly	  a	  concern	  regarding	  the	  role	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  AALC	  and	  the	  
associated	   cooperative	   program.	   Interviewees	   noted	   the	   program’s	   limited	   influence	   on	  
policy	  and	  governance	  at	   the	   state	   level	   and	  beyond,	  attributed	   in	  part	   to	   the	   reality	   that	  
each	  jurisdiction	  maintains	  land	  management	  responsibility.	  The	  cooperative	  program’s	  lack	  
of	   authority	  makes	   successful	   navigation	   of	   politically	   contentious	   issues	   difficult,	   such	   as	  
prescribed	   burning	   and	   feral	   horse	  management,	   and	   it	   struggles	   to	   achieve	   influence	   at	  
higher	  levels	  of	  government	  and	  in	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  political	  arenas.91	  
This	   issue	  of	  authority	  raises	  questions	  about	  how	  the	  cooperative	  program	  achieves	  
biodiversity	  objectives	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   legislative	  mandate.	  While	   the	  Alps	  Strategic	  Plan	  
assigns	   a	   range	   of	   responsibilities	   to	   individuals	   and	   groups	   in	   the	   cooperative	   program,	  
these	  are	  all	  ‘soft’,	  aspirational	  activities	  (Table	  5	  row	  6	  and	  7).	  This	  is	  because	  the	  states	  and	  
territories	   hold	   statutory	   responsibility	   for	   biodiversity	   and	   land	   management,	   and	  
cooperative	   cross-­‐border	   arrangements	   operate	   under	   an	  MOU.	   	   Interviewees	   confirmed	  
the	   important	   role	   of	   the	   program	   in	   facilitating	   cross-­‐border	   learning,	   but	   noted	   it	   has	  
limited	   effectiveness	   because	   legislative	   mandates	   and	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   decision	   making	  
ultimately	   rests	   with	   the	   states.	   Cross-­‐border	   collaboration	   was	   an	   ‘add-­‐on’	   to	   park	  
managers’	  jobs;	  and	  with	  constrained	  resources	  both	  within	  the	  cooperative	  program	  and	  in	  
the	  agencies	  themselves,	  the	  program	  struggles	  to	  achieve	  its	  goal	  of	  a	  consistent	  approach:	  
It	   still	   comes	   down	   to	   the	   jurisdictions	   that	   have	   the	   control	   of	   the	   areas	   they	  manage	   to	  
choose	  their	  priorities	  and	  allocate	  their	  resources.	  So,	  we	  don’t	  necessarily	  have	  a	  consistent	  
approach	  (Victorian	  Participant).	  	  
Issues	   of	   authority	   in	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   are	   attributable	   to	   Australia’s	   system	   of	  
cooperative	   federalism	  where	   responsibility	   for	  managing	   the	   land	   and	   the	   biodiversity	   it	  
supports	  rests	  with	  individual	  states,	  making	  management	  across	  these	  jurisdictional	  divides	  
problematic.	   The	   challenges	   of	   achieving	   consistency	   across	   borders	   and	   dealing	   with	  
politically	   contentious	   issues	   limit	   the	  practical	   reach	  of	   the	   current	   cooperative	   program.	  
Despite	  a	   range	  of	   impressive	  achievements	  under	  a	   soft	  policy	   instrument	   (i.e.	   an	  MOU),	  
agencies	   frequently	   fail	   to	   implement	   works	   undertaken	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   the	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cooperative	   program,	   limiting	   their	   ability	   to	   deal	   effectively	   with	   Alps-­‐wide	   issues.92	  This	  
underscores	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  cooperative	  arrangements;	  where	  despite	  long-­‐term	  survival,	  
the	  program	  has	  little	  authority	  to	  implement	  its	  agenda.	  
Even	  where	  statutory	  authority	  exists,	  there	  are	  similar	  political	  challenges	  at	  the	  park	  
scale	   for	   Kosciuszko	  National	   Park.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   laundry	   list	   of	   items	   in	   the	   PoM,	   in	  
practice	   political	   matters	   are	   a	   strong	   determinant	   of	   priorities.	   Prescribed	   burning	   is	   an	  
example	   of	   such	   an	   issue.	   The	   push	   to	   increase	   prescribed	   burning	   is	   a	   reaction	   to	  
community	   concerns	   about	   risk	   and	   crowds	   out	   other	   management	   responsibilities.	  
Agencies	   also	   get	   caught	   in	   community	   crossfire	   in	   these	   debates,	   making	   their	   tasks	   as	  
managers	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  other	  values	  even	  more	  challenging.	  	  
	  
6	  	  Design	  implications	  for	  biodiversity	  policy	  
The	   results	   for	   both	   study	   areas	   have	   implications	   for	   designing	   and	   researching	  
biodiversity	  policy	   in	  Australia	  and	  internationally.	  The	  scope	  of	  biodiversity	   legislation	  and	  
how	  governance	  can	  adopt	  a	  broader	  approach	  needs	  to	  be	  directly	  addressed.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	   how	   this	   can	  be	   done	   in	   a	   cooperative	   federalist	   system,	   and	  how	  different	   tiers	   of	  
government	  operate	  in	  the	  same	  geographic	  space,	  are	  key	  issues	  influencing	  authority	  and	  
responsibility	   for	  conserving	  biodiversity.	  Even	  when	  formal	  authority	  and	  responsibility	   to	  
manage	   biodiversity	   are	   clearly	   delegated	   on	   paper,	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   cope	   with	  
political	  and	  economic	  pressures	  is	  a	  perennial	  challenge	  for	  biodiversity	  governance	  globally.	  
Finally,	   an	   intriguing	   result	   that	   merits	   further	   examination	   is	   the	   over-­‐emphasis	   on	  
procedures,	  rather	  than	  outcomes,	  in	  biodiversity	  policy	  design	  revealed	  through	  this	  study.	  	  
The	   narrow	   framing	   of	   biodiversity	   policy	   is	   not	   isolated	   to	  Australia.	   Having	  moved	  
into	  the	  ‘landscape	  era’,93	  the	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  species	  is	  widely	  discussed.	  Yet	  just	  how	  
that	   should	   be	   done	   in	   practice	   in	   Australia	   and	   elsewhere	   has	   remained	   challenging	   for	  
scientific,	   economic,	   and	   political	   reasons. 94 	  While	   Australia	   has	   broadened	   its	   federal	  
legislation	   somewhat	   to	   include	   ecological	   communities	   and	   a	   limited	   set	   of	   threatening	  
processes,	   the	   scope	  of	   the	  EPBC	  Act	   is	   still	   limited.	   In	   the	  United	  States,	  by	   contrast,	   the	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  (2014)	  Conservation	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  see	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scope	  the	  Endangered	  Species	  Act	  of	  1973	  (ESA)	  and	  the	  tools	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  have	  
expanded	   significantly	   to	   include	   more	   avenues	   for	   conserving	   habitat	   and	   improving	  
connectivity.95	  Legal	  actions	  to	  ensure	  the	  ESA	  was	  administered	  and	  agencies	  fulfilled	  their	  
responsibilities	   have	   also	   pushed	   biodiversity	   governance	   toward	   a	   more	   landscape-­‐scale	  
approach.96	  While	   the	   narrower	   scope	   of	   the	   current	   EPBC	  Act	  may	   be	   easier	   to	  manage,	  
legislative	   reform	   is	   likely	   necessary	   to	   support	   the	   desired	   shift	   to	   landscape-­‐scale	  
approaches.	  	  
While	   strategic	   assessment	   is	   a	   favoured	   solution	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   landscape-­‐scale	  
attention	   in	   the	   EPBC	   Act,97	  such	   assessments	   remain	   tied	   to	   MNES.	   This	   is	   particularly	  
problematic	  in	  fragmented	  landscapes	  like	  the	  Midlands,	  where	  the	  integrity	  of	  ecosystems	  
cannot	  hinge	  on	  protecting	  pockets	   of	   vegetation	  while	   less	   threatened	  –	  but	   ecologically	  
important	  –	  vegetation	  is	  affected	  by	  intensified	  agriculture.	  More	  specification	  in	  Part	  10	  of	  
the	   EPBC	   Act	   could	   strengthen	   strategic	   assessments	   by,	   for	   example,	   requiring	  
consideration	  of	  ecosystem	  processes	  and	  functions.	  Strategic	  assessment	   is	  merely	  a	  tool,	  
and	  better	   consideration	  of	   landscape-­‐scale	  and	  cumulative	   impacts	   can	  only	  be	  delivered	  
with	   strongly	   defined	   terms	  of	   reference	   and	   rigorous	   assessment;	   though	   this	  may	  be	   at	  
odds	  with	  the	  vocal	  desire	  by	  the	  Australian	  Government	  to	  cut	  red	  tape	  and	  administrative	  
burden.98	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  scope	  of	  federal	   involvement	  (including	  through	  the	  EPBC	  Act)	  
and	   cross-­‐jurisdictional	   cooperation	   is	   constrained	   by	   the	   Australian	   constitution	   and	   the	  
country’s	   system	   of	   cooperative	   federalism	   (Section	   4.2).	   Although	   interpretations	   of	   the	  
head	   powers	   in	   case	   law	   are	   increasingly	   broad	   and	   the	   federal	   government	   has	   gained	  
influence	   through	   financial	   dominance,99	  there	   remains	   a	   reluctance	   to	   transfer	   further	  
environmental	   governance	   powers	   to	   the	   federal	   government.	   In	   both	   case	   studies,	  
cooperative	   federalism	  makes	   landscape-­‐scale	   conservation	  more	   challenging	   since	   formal	  
authority	   remains	   with	   state	   jurisdictions.	   Issues	   of	   role	   clarity,	   responsibility,	   and	  
accountability	  have	  long	  been	  evident	  in	  Australia,	  and	  even	  intergovernmental	  agreements	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  Press,	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on	   the	  environment100	  have	  not	   resolved	   the	   issues.	  Although	   the	   federal	  government	  has	  
far	  more	  power	  now	  than	  imagined	  at	  the	  time	  of	  federation,101	  the	  recent	  political	  climate	  
has	   favoured	   devolution	   of	   decision-­‐making	   to	   the	   states,	   even	   under	   the	   federal	   EPBC	  
Act.102	  In	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term,	  biodiversity	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  remain	  largely	  a	  state	  
responsibility	  and	  non-­‐statutory	  ways	  of	  gaining	  authority	  to	  work	  at	  a	  landscape-­‐scale	  will	  
likely	  remain	  a	  necessity.	  	  
These	   complexities	   of	   multi-­‐level	   governance	   are	   not	   unique	   to	   biodiversity	  
governance	  in	  Australia.	  The	  United	  States103	  and	  European	  Union104	  face	  similar	  challenges	  
in	  balancing	  state	  sovereignty	  against	  coherent	  and	  strategic	  responses	  across	  jurisdictions.	  
While	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	   interplay	   in	  biodiversity	  governance	  has	  created	  conflicts	  and	  
slowed	  progress,	  actors	  have	  grown	  more	  sophisticated	  in	  dealing	  with	  these	  dynamics;	  and	  
efforts	  to	  move	  to	  more	  participatory,	  ‘bottom	  up’	  approaches	  have	  led	  to	  some	  procedural	  
improvements105	  although	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  largely	  driven	  by	  situational	  conflict.106	  Despite	  
some	  advances,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  way	  forward	  on	  how	  to	  manage	  these	  dynamics	  or	  how	  to	  
resolve	  the	  need	  for	  some	  central	  oversight	  against	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  for	  a	  public	  
good	  like	  biodiversity,	  especially	  on	  private	  land.107	  
While	  attention	  to	  statutory	  authority	  is	  important,	  collaboration	  across	  agencies	  and	  
jurisdictions	   is	   often	   not	   the	   result	   of	   law,	   but	   of	   political	   mandates.108	  Economic	   and	  
political	   influences,	   such	   as	   the	   primacy	   of	   agriculture	   in	   the	   Midlands	   landscape	   and	  
contemporary	  political	  pressures	  pushing	  Alps	  management	  to	  respond	  to	  public	  demands,	  
highlight	  that	  the	  political	  environment	  complicates	  formal	  authority.	  Political	  influences	  are	  
strong	   drivers	   in	   both	   case	   study	   systems	   and	   are	   an	   intrinsic	   feature	   of	   natural	   resource	  
governance.109	  Spending	   too	  much	   time	   “doing	   politics”	   is	   a	   longstanding	   complaint	   from	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managers,110	  but	   actors	   must	   work	   in	   a	   more	   sophisticated	   way	   with	   politics	   to	   actively	  
buffer	   external	   influences	   and	   achieve	   biodiversity	   outcomes.	   This	   is	   an	   under-­‐researched	  
area	   in	   public	   administration,	   but	   such	   buffering	   could	   include	   strategic	   positioning,	  
networking,	   defending	   (e.g.	   finding	   ways	   to	   maintain	   capacity	   during	   times	   of	   financial	  
pressure),	   and	  prospecting	   (e.g.	   searching	   for	  new	  ways	   the	  agencies	   can	  address	  political	  
problems).111	  Identifying	   solutions	   that	   addressed	   both	   the	   scientific	   need	   for	   larger-­‐scale	  
approaches	   and	   the	   political	   problems	   of	   legal	   action	   under	   the	   ESA	   were	   critical	   to	  
achieving	  landscape-­‐scale	  collaboration	  in	  the	  United	  States.112	  
It	  is	  possible	  the	  procedural	  focus	  observed	  in	  the	  case	  study	  regions	  was	  also	  linked	  
to	   authority.	   A	   common	   traditional	   view	   of	   public	   agencies	   is	   that	   they	   are	  meant	   to	   be	  
neutral	   conduits,	   enacting	   the	   will	   of	   the	   people,	   as	   expressed	   through	   politicians.113	  To	  
maintain	   this	   hierarchy	   of	   authority,	   governments	   place	   a	   high	   value	   on	   procedural	  
rationality,	  which	  disconnects	  process	  from	  substantive	  outcomes.114	  
The	   linguistic	  mode	   and	   passive	   phrasing	   evident	   in	   the	   documents	   analysed	   in	   this	  
research	  imply	  an	  assumption	  that	  governments	  will	  be	  able	  to	  control	  future	  actions	  with	  a	  
series	   of	   propositions	   and	   proposals	   that	   are	   presumed	   to	   achieve	   the	   desired	   outcomes	  
without	  clear	   linkages.115	  Like	  many	  policy	  documents,	  those	   in	  this	  study	  relied	  heavily	  on	  
irrealis	  mode	   and	   passive	   voice,	  which	   creates	   uncertainty	   about	   just	  who	   is	   obligated	   to	  
undertake	   actions,116	  and	   to	   whom	   they	   are	   accountable	   if	   they	   do	   not	   comply.	   This	   is	  
especially	  the	  case	  for	  the	  Program	  Report	  in	  the	  Midlands.	  While	  uncertainty	  is	  inherent	  in	  
policymaking,	   constructing	   policies	   using	   vague	   language	   and	   process	   creates	   more	  
uncertainty.	   Yet	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   imprecision	   and	   lack	   of	   clarity	   is	   deliberate.	   When	  
confronted	  with	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study,	  one	  federal	  employee	  responded	  by	  listing	  a	  range	  
of	  reasons	  why	  this	  was	  done,	  including:	  
When	  our	  policy	  tools	  are	  not	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  problem,	  but	  we	  have	  no	  others…When	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our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  issue	  is	  poor…When	  we	  don’t	  want	  take	  responsibility	  for	  an	  issue	  
that	   is	  our	  responsibility…When	  we	  don’t	  want	  take	  responsibility	   for	  an	   issue	  that	   is	  
not	  our	  responsibility….[emphasis	  added]	  
This	  covers	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  situations,	  and	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  the	  rationale	  behind	  
the	  construction	  of	  (and	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in)	  policies	  analysed	  in	  this	  study.	  
The	  heavy	  procedural	  emphasis	   in	   the	  biodiversity	  policies	  examined	  here	   is	  an	  area	  
meriting	  further	  attention	  in	  policy	  design.	  An	  overemphasis	  on	  process	  can	  shift	  attention	  
away	   from	  biodiversity	  outcomes117	  and	   the	   substantive	  elements	  of	   environmental	  policy	  
and	  law.118	  Such	  concerns	  are	  part	  of	  wider	  debates	  in	  environmental	  policy	  and	  law	  about	  
procedural	  versus	   substantive	   law119	  and	  outputs	  versus	  outcomes.120	  A	   topic	   that	   remains	  
underexplored	  in	  biodiversity	  policy,	  however,	   is	  whether	  this	  emphasis	  on	  procedure	  is	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  considering	  outcomes	  and	  how	  they	  are	  distributed.	  
This	  points	  to	  distributive	  and	  procedural	  elements	  of	  social	  justice,	  critical	  aspects	  of	  
legitimate	  environmental	  governance.121	  In	  the	  two	  case	  studies,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  process	  as	  
a	   means	   to	   achieve	   outcomes	   was	   evident	   both	   on	   paper	   and	   in	   practice,	   suggesting	   an	  
asymmetrical	  emphasis	  on	  procedural	  justice.	  Importantly,	  fair	  process	  is	  no	  guarantee	  of	  a	  
fair	   outcome,	   particularly	   as	   distributed	   across	   the	   social,	   economic	   and	   environmental	  
dimensions.	   Social	   justice	   research	   has	   historically	   assumed	   people	   care	   more	   about	  
procedures	  than	  distribution	  of	  outcomes,	  extrapolating	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Lind	  and	  Tyler122	  
yet	   a	  meta-­‐analysis	   of	   justice	   research123	  challenged	   this	   notion,	   suggesting	   the	   converse.	  
The	   relationships	   between	   just	   outcomes,	   just	   process,	   and	   perceptions	   of	   fairness	   are	  
complex,	   but	   a	   clear	   message	   from	   justice	   research	   is	   that	   a	   narrow	   focus	   on	   any	   one	  
element	  is	  undesirable.	  	  
Greater	   attention	   to	  outcomes	  and	  how	   they	  outcomes	  are	  distributed	   is	   critical	   for	  
effective	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  especially	   in	  situations	  such	  as	  the	  Midlands	  where	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Wallace,	  KJ,	  "Confusing	  means	  with	  ends:	  A	  manager's	  reflections	  on	  experience	  in	  agricultural	  landscapes	  of	  Western	  
Australia"	  (2003)	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public	  good	  is	  largely	  on	  private	  land.	  The	  outcomes	  matter	  both	  for	  society	  and	  the	  private	  
individuals	   involved.	   Although	   the	   importance	   of	   considering	   social	   justice	   elements	   of	  
biodiversity	  governance	  are	  recognised,124	  procedural	  justice	  is	  still	  the	  major	  focus	  and	  little	  
published	   research	  explores	  how	  social	   justice	  principles	   feature	   in	   the	   implementation	  of	  
biodiversity	  policy.	  A	  neglect	  of	  both	  distributive	  and	  procedural	  justice	  in	  practice	  has	  been	  
identified	   in	   biodiversity	   policy	   in	   the	   EU.125	  Social	   justice	   principles,	   incorporating	   both	  
procedural	  and	  distributive	  justice,	  provide	  a	  useful	  frame	  for	  advancing	  biodiversity	  policy.	  	  
7	  	  Conclusion	  
Clearly	   defined	   and	   allocated	   roles	   and	   responsibilities	   are	   essential	   for	   effective	  
biodiversity	  policy	  implementation	  among	  multiple	  actors.	  Multiple	  actors	  are	  a	  key	  feature	  
of	  biodiversity	  conservation	   in	   these	   two	   landscapes,	  and	  many	   landscapes	  globally	  where	  
biodiversity	  is	  valued.	  In	  the	  Midlands	  agricultural	  landscape,	  statutory	  authority	  only	  exists	  
to	  protect	  MNES	  with	  other	  elements	  placed	  at	  jeopardy	  through	  inadequate	  consideration	  
and	  allocation	  of	  authority	  at	  a	   landscape	  scale.	  The	  murky	   interface	  between	  biodiversity	  
policy	   and	   irrigation	   development	   in	   the	   Midlands	   is	   an	   example	   of	   limited,	   unclear	  
hierarchies	  of	  authority.	  If	  Australia	  is	  to	  achieve	  biodiversity	  objectives	  at	  a	  landscape	  scale,	  
there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  clarify	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  achieving	  objectives	  at	  that	  scale.	  In	  the	  Alps,	  
roles	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  clearer,	  but	  the	  same	  question	  remains:	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  
landscape-­‐scale	   biodiversity	   objectives?	   Given	   the	   constitutional	   and	   legislative	   policy	  
arrangements	  in	  Australia,	  this	   is	  still	  unanswered	  in	  a	  multi-­‐jurisdictional	  situation	  like	  the	  
Alps.	  	  
Both	  weak	  and	  limited	  authority	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  analyses,	  again	  illustrating	  a	  
broader,	  systemic	  issue	  in	  biodiversity	  policy	  Australia,	  with	  clear	  parallels	  elsewhere.	  In	  the	  
Midlands,	  the	  interplay	  between	  biodiversity	  institutions	  and	  strong	  economic	  and	  political	  
drivers	   suggest	   the	   former	   are	   weak	   by	   comparison,	   both	   on	   paper	   and	   in	   practice.	  
Participant	  concerns	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Midlands	  ecosystem	  are	  reasonable,	  given	  that	  
even	  the	  regulatory	  safety	  net	  is	  relatively	  weak	  and	  framing	  is	  narrow.	  In	  the	  Australian	  Alps,	  
park	  agencies	   like	  the	  NPWS	  have	  the	   legislative	  mandate	  within	   jurisdictional	  boundaries,	  
but	   conservation	   of	   biodiversity	   is	   a	   minor	   item	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   and	   easily	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overshadowed	  by	  other	  political	  imperatives.	  For	  the	  AALC	  the	  problem	  is	  even	  more	  acute,	  
as	  it	  is	  an	  entirely	  voluntary	  cooperative	  program,	  subject	  to	  politics	  both	  within	  and	  across	  
jurisdictions.	  Although	  the	  issues	  and	  threats	  in	  each	  case	  study	  are	  different,	  both	  highlight	  
questions	   about	   how	   to	   strike	   the	   appropriate	   balance	   between	   forced	   and	  un-­‐mandated	  
compliance	  and	  cooperation	  to	  achieve	  conservation	  of	  a	  public	  good.	  
The	   integration	  of	   social	   justice	   into	  biodiversity	  policy	   is	   a	   substantive	  policy	  design	  
issue.	   The	   asymmetrical	   emphasis	   on	   process	   on	   paper	   and	   practice	   highlights	   a	   need	   to	  
investigate	   the	   social	   justice	   dimensions	   of	   biodiversity	   policy.	   This	   research	   suggests	  
increased	  attention	  on	  distributive	   justice	   could	   improve	  policy	  design,	   but	   it	   is	   important	  
that	   this	   also	   extend	   to	   policies-­‐in-­‐practice.	   While	   focusing	   on	   elements	   that	   can	   be	  
monitored	  and	  controlled	  is	  a	  common	  response	  to	  environmental	  problems,126	  a	  conscious	  
effort	  must	  also	  be	  made	  to	  elevate	  the	  importance	  of	  substantive	  outcomes	  in	  biodiversity	  
governance.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Hironaka	  and	  Schofer,	  n	  114	  at	  216 
